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ABSTRACT 
The Antarctic Treaty of 1959, ratified in 1961, is 
subject to review in 1991. This thesis presents a 
negotiating position for the United Stat~s in the event the 
Treaty is reviewed. To do so, it examines important aspects 
of the review process, presenting a broad view of the 
issues, parties, and strategies facing the United States in 
these negotiations. In addition, major issues which have 
evolved over the past 30 years within the parameters of the 
Antarctic Treaty System are explored, as well as areas of 
potential future conflict. The positions of those countries 
within and those outside the Antarctic Treaty System are 
identified in order to anticipate areas of conflict and 
consensus during tl,e negotiation process. Additionally, 
some planning implications are explored which highlight 
operational support areas of concern. The thesis concludes 
that it is in the United States' interest for the Antarctic 
Treaty to continue in its present form and presents a 
negotiating strategy to achieve that end. 
~-c~~s_: ~-o-~ 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Antarctic Treaty of 1959, ratified in 1961, is 
subject to its first formal review and, perhaps, 
renegotiation in 1991. This potential review process 
presents opportunities and challenges for the United States, 
as well as the international community as a whole. This 
thesis will present a negotiating position for the u.s. in 
anticipation of such a review (or renegotiation) of the 
current Antarctic Treaty. To do so, it will examine 
important aspects of the review process which have developed 
within the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), as the Antarctic 
Treaty and subsequent Conventions have come to be addressed. 
Issues, anticipated and unanticipated, which have evolved 
over the past JO years will also be examined. What are the 
positions of the original signatories, as well as those 
countries which have acceded to the Treaty, with regard to 
the Treaty as it currently stands? Areas of agreement as 
well as disagreement must be identified in order to develop 
negotiating positions to counter incompatible goals. Which 
issues could fracture the 30 year consensus which 
characterizes the Antarctic Treaty? What issues are of 
particular importance to the United States, and why? And, 
how can U.s. interests best be served in the event of a 
formal review, or even renegotiation, of the Treaty? 
1 
Answers to these and other questions must be articulated in 
order to develop a viable negotiating strategy in the u.s. 
national interest. Several United Nations' initiated 
negotiations, such as those conducted for the "Agreement 
Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies" (the "Moon Treaty") or the U.N. convention 
on the Law of the Sea, provide additional areas for 
exa~ination at some future date and are not included in this 
thesis. 
A brief foray into the history of Antarctica in Chapter 
I, will set tne stage for analysis of the Antarctic Treaty 
System which follows in Chapter II. Examination of the ATS 
will provide background information critical to the 
development of a u.s. negotiating strategy. 
!--
~- ... 
What is the 
conflicts been 
resolved? Which procedural processes have proven effective 
or ineffective? What has the evolutionary process been for 
the Antarctic Treaty Syslt!m? 
proven remarkably resilient over the past thirty years. 
What factors contributed to this and how can they be 
utilized for the future? Chapter II provides the framework 
around which a negotiating strategy can be built. 
Chapter III, Issues in Antarctica, will examine three 
concerns which present the greatest challenges to all 




The most long standing of these is the question of 
sovereignty which will be explained at length in Chapter 
III. Two more contemporary issues which are of concern, and 
may prove equally divisive, are the questions of developing 
mineral resources in and adjacent to Antarctica and, closely 
related, the ecological and environmental threat to the area 
posed by man. 
After examination of the sovereignty, mineral resource, 
and environmental issues presented in Chapter III, Chapter 
IV will review the current positions of those countries 
which have acceded to the Treaty, as well as those with 
"non-consultative" status--~ status allowing limited 
participat-ion in Antarctic matters--should a formal review 
occur. Positions of countries with no direct involvement in 
Antarctica or the Treaty, but expressing a very vocal desire 
t~ charg~ its current status from Treaty governance to an 
international status under the auspices of the United 
Nations, will also be exa~ined. This will include a number 
of the "non-aligned" countries. After review of the 
positions of all potential participants, a neaotiating 
position which best advances U.S. national interests will be 
articulated. 
In the unlikely event that hostilities were to erupt in 
or near the Antarctic continent due to Treaty changes, or 
for other unforeseen reasons, Chapter V, u.s. Naval 
3 
Capabilities, will provide an assessment of the u.s. Navy's 
current and projected capabilities to deal with such a 
situation in the Antarctic region. This assessment will 
focus on three areas--antisubmarine warfare (ASW), supply, 
and command, control, and communication (C3 )--and will be 
quite general in nature. Summary and conclusions with 
predictions for the future of the Antarctic Treaty, a~ well 
prospects for continued u.s. interest in Antarctica are 
presented in Chapter VI. 
A. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
1. Antarctica the Continent 
Speculation about the continent of Antarctica 
stretches back to the time of the Greeks. Its name is 
derived from two words, the Greek word arktos, meaning "the 
Bear" (the northern constellation), which referred to the 
Arctic region, and anti, "opposite", thus antarktikos, 
"opposite the Bear" and opposite the Arctic.1 Captain 
James Ccok was one of the first Europeans to land a party on 
Antarctica, sometime between 1772-75, as he circumnavigated 
the globe. This was the "first truly scientific trip to the 
Antarctic Continent" , 2 and provided invaluable information 
about Antarctica. However, Captain Cook, as did many others 
1 H. G. R. King, The Antarctic, (New York: Arco Publishing 
Company, Inc., 1969), p. 1. 
2 Luis H. Herico, Antarctica; Chile's Claim, (Washingtor., 
D.C.; National Defense University, 1987), p. 6. King, ~ 




who followed, remained unaware of the exact size or extent 
of this the world's fifth largest continent. cook did 
report on the large number of whales and seals in the area, 
whose commercial exploitation also served to advance 
exploration in the Antarctic region. Nevertheless, 
exploration contihued at a very slow pace. Not until 1898, 
did a party of Europeans winter over in Antarctica. This 
occurred when the Belgian ship, Belgica, commanded by Adrien 
de Gerlache with a crew of 19, bec~me trapped by ice.3 A 
land of extremes--"the coldest, highest, iciest, and most 
remote continent on Earth" 4 --Antarctica defied all but the 
most superficial exploration until the twentieth century 
when a flurry of expeditions scoured the Continent. Among 
the more noteworthy of these expeditions was "the race to 
the Pole" which occurred in 1911-1912. A Norwegian team 
lead by Roald Amundsen defeated a British team headed by 
Royal Navy Captain Robert F. Scott in the race to "discover" 
the South Pole.!5 After this setback, the British partially 
redeemed their exploratory reputation with Sir Ernest 
Shackleton's expedition from 1914-1917. Though the 
3 Jack Child, Antarctica and $Quth American Geopolitics; 
Frozen Lebensraum, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1988), p. 
12. 
4 John A. Heap and Martin w. Holdgate, "The Antarctic Treaty 
System as an Environmental Mechanism--An Approach to 
Environmental Issues," in Antarctic Treaty System: An 
Assessment. Proceedings of a Workshop Held at Beardmore 
South Field Camp. Antarctica. January 7-13. 1985 
~ashington, D.C.: National Acaoemy Press, 1986), p. 195. 
Heap and Holdgate, pp. 12-13. 
5 
expedition failed in its objective of crossing the Antarctic 
continent from sea to sea, via the South Pole, it 
nevertheless made significant scientific biological, 
hydrographical, and m~teorological discoverie!>. 6 
Technological advances in transportation, housing, and 
survival equipment continued to enhance efforts to explore 
Antarctica throughout the twentieth century. These advances 
culminated in efforts undertaken during the Third 
International Geophysical Year. 
2. Third International Geophysical Year ( IGY) 
The Third International Geophysical Year?' "has been 
described by Hugh Odishaw, the man chiefly responsible for 
organizing the vast American effort, as 'the single most 
significant peaceful activity of mankind since the 
Renaissance and the Copernican Revolution,'q~ It was 
conceived "In 1950, [when] a group of American scientists 
met inforMally at the home of one of them [James A. Van 
Allen] in Silver Spring, Md., to greet Prof. sydney Chapman, 
6 sir Ernest ~hackleton, South: The Story of Shackleton's 
Last Expedition 1914-1917, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 
1920), p. 344. 
?'The Third International Geophysical Year was preceded by 
"Polar Year" studies in 1882-1883 and 1932-1933. Antarctica 
in the International Geophysical Year: Based on a Symposium 
on the Antarctic, Geophysical Monograph No. 1, ~erican 
Geophysical Union of the National Academy of Sciences, 
National Research Council (Baltimore, Maryland; Waverly 
Press, Inc., 1956), p. 1. 
~Walter Sullivan, Assault on the Unknown; The International 
Geophysical Year (New York: McGraw-Hill Company, Inc., 
1961), p. 4. 
6 
.. . . 
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.. 
of Englar.d, one of the world's leading geophysicists." 9 
This informal meeting would result in 1957, in an 
international endeavor to advance scientific knowledge in 
geophysical sciences, such as geology, oceanography, and 
meteorology. The IGY involved research throughout the 
world, however, it was the unique, pristine environment of 
the Antarctic which entranced scientists, some of whom 
interpreted the Third IGY "as a turning-point in the sphere 
of science ... 1 0 overall U.S. preparations for the IGY 
began in November 1953, while the u.s. Navy began its 
support operations in 1954, with the u.s.s. Atka's 
"preliminary reconnaissance along the coast of 
Antarctica •••• to examine ice conditions and possible station 
sites ••• " .1.1 For eighteen months ( 1 July 1957 to 31 
December 1958), the world's scientists found themselves able 
to "put aside their customary allegiances and work together 
in the commonwealth of science, 11 .1 2 as they worked to 
uncover Antarctica's secrets. The united States was 
interested in the Antarctic for numerous reasons, among 
them, the "opportunity for extensive geomagnetic 
studies, ••• for the study of ionospheric phenomena affecting 
9congress, House, Committee on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce, International Geophysical Year: Tbe Arctic and 
~tfrctica, 85th Cong., 2d sess., 1958, p. 10. 
Peter Beck, The International Politics of Antarctica 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1986), p. 46. 
11congress, House, Committee on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce, International Geophysical Year, p. 126 • 
.12King, The Antarctic, p. 234. 
7 
radio propagation .•• and concentrations of cosmic 
radiation ••• [as well as] tracking ..• earth satellites having 
the significant North-South orbit- •• 1 3 Research 
conducted in these areas was to result in significant 
advances for the United states and others. In the separate 
sphere of politics, a result of the IGY was the realization 
by the governments involved in Antarctic research of the 
potential changes in the region's status quo because of the 
increasing international interest in Antarctica. The 
governments " ••• perceived a threat to the existing de facto 
neutralization of the continent, a change which would prove 
unwelcome, inconvenient, and even dangerous. "1 4 This 
threat perception was exacerbated on the u.s. front by the 
successful launch of the Soviet satellite, Sputnik, in late 
1957, with its political and military implications. This 
Soviet success, as well as repeated efforts by India to 
place the subject of Antarctic jurisdiction on the United 
Nations agenda encouraged states involved in Antarctica to 
develop some sort of international agreement. 1 5 As a 
result of both the unprecedented international cooperation 
achieved during the IGY, and, as U.S. Secretary of state 
Dulles noted, " ••• deeply impressed with the danger if that 
13congress, House, Committee on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce, International Geophysical Year, p. 21. 
14seck, The International Politics of Antarctica, p. 82. 
15oeborah Shapley, The Seventh Continent: Antarctica in a 
Resource Age (Washington, D.C.: Resources For The Future, 
Inc., 1985), p.90. 
8 
-------------------------------- --
unfolding continenc [Antarctica] should become a scene of 
international rivalry and if its physical possibilities were 
to be used to threaten world peace and security" 1 6 , a 
treaty governing its use was proposed, a proposal which 
eventually resulted in today's Antarctic Treaty System. 
16Department of State Bulletin, 23 June 1958, pp. 1035-
1042, as cited in Department of State, American Foreign 
Policy; Current Documents. 1958 (Washington, D.C.; 
Government Printing Office, 1962, p. 38. 
9 
II. ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM 
The Antarctic Treaty system ( ATS) is the present day 
compilation of thirty-~~d years development of a United 
States' initiative forwarded by President Eisenhower in May 
1958. Designed to "assure that peaceful conditions will 
continue indefinitely by mutual agreement, permitting 
development of scientific research and cooperation" 17 , 
President Eisenhower invited the 11 nations, which had 
participated in Antarctic research during the IGY, to 
negotiate an agreement for Antarctica. His 1958 proposal 
came to fruition 18 months later with the signing of the 
Antarctic Treaty of 1959. 
A. THE ANTARCTIC TREATY 
1. Negotiations 
Seeds of Antarctic negotiations can be traced back 
at least two decades before formal negotiations took place 
in 1959. It can even be argued that such seeds were 
planted, as concerned the United States, as early as 1924, 
by u.s. Secretary of State, Charles E. Hughes. Secretary of 
State Hughes established the u.s. position with regard to 
Antarctica as one of not claiming any portion of the 
continent, while reserving the right to do so at some future 
1 7 nsoviet Pledges Antarctic Peace," New York Times, 1 June 
1959, p. A7. 
10 
--------------------------------------
date, and not recognizi~g the claims of other nations. This 
issue of establishing sovereignty would be raised repeatedly 
over the following decades. For example, in 1939, when the 
Norwegians declared portions of Antarctica under Norwegian 
sovereignty, the u.s. responded with correspondence which, 
while acknowledging receipt of the Norwegian note declaring 
sections of Antarctica under Norway's jurisdiction, 
reiterated the u.s. position "that the United States 
reserves all rights which it or its citizens may have in the 
area mentioned".:L a, that area being Antarctica. The 1924 
u.s. policy of neither claiming, nor recognizing the claims 
of others remained in 6lfect through Treaty negotiations in 
1959. Other options, such as the one forwarded by the 
Policy Planning Staff in mid-1948, which 11 ••• recommended 
that the United States support in principle the 
establishment of an international status for Antarctica, in 
the form of a United Nations trusteeship ••• " .19, were 
pursued by the United States through diplomatic channels but 
met with failure. Those nations with territorial claims in 
Antarctica resisted, in varying degrees, all efforts to 
internationalize the Continent. In a counter proposal to 
internationalization, Chile, in 1948, first advanced the 
18Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United 
States; Diplomatic Papers 1939, vol 2 (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 2. 
19Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United 
States: Diplomatic Papers 1948, vol 1, part 2 (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 982. 
11 
notion of "a sort of stand-still agreement under which none 
of the countries interested in Antarctica would make efforts 
to promote their claims during a five year period and uuring 
this period Antarctica would be open to scientific and 
meteorological study by all. 11 2 0 Though discussed, over 
the next several years, resolution of the Antarctic issue 
was not achieved until formal negotiations began a decade 
later, in 1958. Seeking to solidify the political and 
scientific advances achieved as a result of the 
Tnternational Geophysical Year 1957-1958, !2 nations--
Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Great Britain, 
Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the U.s.s.R., and 
the U.S. --met in Washington D.c. in October 1959, for the 
final negotiation of the Antarctic Treaty.21 Based on a 
foundation of 59 meetings, which had been conducted over the 
previous 18 months, these final negotiations proceeded with 
minimal delay. The delays which did occur, focused 
primarily on the territorial claims of seven of the 12 
participating countries.22 The seven countries ~lth 
territorial claims included Argentina, Australia, Chile, 
France, Great Britain, New Zealand and Norway (see Appendix 
20oepartment of state, Foreign Relations of the United 
states; Diplomatic Papers 1948, vol 1, part 2 (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 1002. 
21walter Sullivan, "Antarctic Talks Aim At Arms Ban,"~ 
!¥~ Times, 14 October 1959, p. A17. 
Walter Sullivan, "Antarctic Talks Making Progress, tL H.mt 
York Times, 4 November 1959, P. A37. 
12 
B for a map of territorial claims). Belgium, Japan, South 
Africa, and :.:he two superpowers--the Soviet Union and the 
United States--made no claim to Antarctica, neither did they 
recognize the claims of others. 
2. The Treaty Itself 
The Antarctic Treaty is a relatively short treaty, 
with only fourteen articles. Its primary goal, as stated in 
Article I, is to maintain Antarctica's nonmilitarized 
status. Antarctica was to be used "for peaceful purposes 
only". 2 3 There were to be no military fo~ti~ic .. ~icm; or 
bases, nor testing of any military weapons in Antarctica, 
though military personnel and equipment could be used to 
support scientific research. Articles II and III address 
the "freedom of scientific investigation, ••• cooperation", 
and exchange among the participating nations. A solution to 
the "sovereignty issue", which had, for a time, stymied 
final negotiations, appears in Article IV. This Article 
effectively froze territorial claims of the signatories for 
the life of the treaty. Another relevant issue addressed by 
the Treaty was the banning of nuclear explosions or the 
disposal of nuclear waste in Antarctica {Article V). 
2 3 Department of St,.te, "Antarctic Treaty, 11 1 Dece:.~.&. 
1959, TIAS no. 4780, United States Treaties and Other 
International Agreements, vol. 12, pt. 1, p. 795. 
13 
The in~tiative for this provision came late in the 
[negotiating] conference from southern hemisphere 
nations, [particularly Chile and Argentina]. The 
provision was included against Soviet and United States' 
wishes, 2 4 
though the u.s. accepted the provision "because it [did] not 
contain any prohibition on the peaceful use of nuclear 
material in Antarctica." 2 5 Article VI defines the area 
encompassed by the Treaty, "the area south of 60 degrees 
South Latitude", while at the same time recognizing the 
international freedom of the high seas. Another crucial 
~~nr.P.pt is included in Article VII which provides for 
unrestricted access among the signatories to the entire 
Antarctic continent, territorial claims not withstanding. 
"Complete freedom of access at any time to any or all areas 
of Antarctica" is given to designated observers. 
Jurisdiction over nationals (a legal "subset" of the issue 
of sovereignty) appears in Article VIII, which allowed for 
the jurisdiction by each contracting party over its 
nationals. In the event of a dispute over such 
jurisdiction, Article VIII provides for "immediate 
consultation" to resolve the matter. Article IX provides 
administrative guidelines with regard to meetings and 
reports. The problem of "disputes" appears in Article XI 
which notes that if the parties involved can not resolve the 
24w. M. Bush, Antarctica and International Law; A 
Collection of Inter-State and National Documents, val. 1 
~~don: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1982)! p. 63. 
Ibid., p. 39 
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matter, it will then be referred to the International Court 
of Justice. Articles XII and XIII discuss modifications or 
amendments to the Treaty, the length of the Treaty ("thirty 
years from the date of entry into force"), and ratification 
and accession to the Treaty. From guidelines laid out in 
this short, straightforward document, Antarctic Treaty 
membership has developed into a "two-tier" system. All UN 
member nations. a.:; well as an:~t nation "invited by the 
Consulatative Parties", are encouraged to sign the Treaty. 
If the acceding country is "adjudged to perform 'substantial 
research activity' in Antarctica", it may be granted 
"consultative" status. 2 6 Only those nations with 
consultative status may participate in the decisionmaking 
processes of the Antarctic Treaty System. Consultative 
meetings, which have evolved to being held evary two years, 
address issues related to "governing the activities of 
states in Antarctica, including its use for peace:ul 
purposes only, the undertaking to facilitate scientific 
research and international cooperation in the process of 
studying the continent", as well as other pertinent 
issues. 2 7 A unique aspect of consultative meetings is 
that any substantive recommendation made must be approved by 
all parties. As previously stated, though the Antarctic 
-----------
26peter J. Beck, "A New Polar Factor in International 
Relations," World Today, April 1989, p. 66. 
27yuri M. Rybakov, "Juridical Nature of the 1959 Treaty 
System," Aotarctic Treaty System; An AsSessment, pp. 38-39. 
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Treaty is a short treaty, it is one which has proven to be 
longlasting and farsighted. 
3. Conventions to the Treaty 
While remarkably flexible and prescient in many 
ways, the Treaty did require additional clarification andjor 
elaboration on several issues in the years following its 
ratification. Conventions to the Treaty proved to be 
crucial components in the resolution of these issues. With 
regard to the legal status of conventions, 
As L. Oppenheim pointed out, 'International compacts 
which take the form of written contracts are sometimes 
termed not only agreements or treaties, but acts, 
conventions, declarations, protocols, and the like. But 
there is no essential difference between them, and their 
binding force upon the contracting parties is the same, 
whatever be their name.'2S 
~hree conventions have entered into force since ratification 
of the Treaty. The first of these was the "Agreed Measures 
for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora", a 
innocuous measure designed to supplement the Treaty's 
Article IX's "preservation and conservation of living 
resources in Antarctica." This was followed by the 
"Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals" which 
entered into force on 11 March 1978, six years after its 
adoption by ATS members in 1972. Its "basic aim was to 
guard against any depletion of [seal] stocks through over-
28Lassa Oppenheim, International Law; A Treatise, vol. 1, 
8th ed., edited by H. Lauterpacht (London: Lonqmans, Green 
and Co., 1955), p. 898. 
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exploitation in case commercial sealing resumed." 2 9 The 
final convention which entered into force 7 April 1982, was 
the convention on the "Conservation of Antarctic Marine 
Living Resources" (CAMLR). Adopted in Canberra, Australia, 
1980, CAMLR was precipitated by concern for krill (a small 
shrimp-like crustacean) near the bottom of the Antarctic 
ecosystem. The result of this concern was an ecosystem 
approach to conservation, i.e. preservation of all 1 i ving 
resources, not any particular one. A fourth convention was 
negotiated but has thus far failed to be ratified. This is 
the controversial "Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic 
Mineral Resource Activity" ( CRAMRA) • Initiated with high 
hopes, CRAMRA sought to regulate mining activities i~ 
Antarctica. Unexpected opposition to the convention has 
apparently killed it "at least for the foreseeable 
future." 3 0 These Conventions have directly contributed to 
the longevity of the Treaty. 
4. current Meabership 
Antarctic Treaty membership is currently composed of 
2131 consultative parties and 17 acceding nations (Table 
1). 
29peter Beck, Tbe International Politics of Antarctica 
srew York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), p. 220. 0 Philip Shabecoff, "U.s. Seeks Ban on the Exploration of 
Minerals and oil in Antarctica," New York Times, 14 November 
1990, p. A1. 
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Table 1. Antarctic Treaty nations 3 2 

















































North Korea (1987) 
Austria (1987) 
Canada (1988) 
As indicated by the dates of accession, 18 countries have 
joined the ATS within the past decade, a veritable rush as 
compared with nine accessions over the previous 20 years. 
Various explanations for the increasing interest in 
31consultative party membership was reduced from 22 to 21 
when the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic 
of Germany unified. 
32"The Austral Crescent," Antarctic Journal, December 
1988, p. 8, and author's research. 
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Antarctica have been offered. Some countries are finally 
financially able to fund Antarctic research, which is a 
prerequisite for consultative status. Others recognize the 
approaching 30 year deadline of the Treaty, and want to be 
involved if the Treaty is reviewed or renegotiated. 
Whatever the motivation, the growing number of countries 
within the Antarctic Treaty System has both positive and 
negative consequences. On the positive side, the nations 
currently involved cut across all economic and political 
spheres, putting to rest the old argument that the ATS was 
an exclusive club. The flip side of the increased numbers 
involved in Antarctic decision-making, is that consensus, 
the way all substantive issues are decided, has become 
increasingly difficult to achieve. This is readily apparent 
from the recent difficulty in which the CRAMRA foundered. 
The composition of the ATS membership must quite obviously 
be taken into account in developing any negotiation 
strategy. This issue of ATS membership and those nations 
and non-governmental agencies or parties outside the ATS 
will be examined more closely in Chapter IV, after several 
crucial issues, which will affect any negotiation process, 
are addressed in Chapter III. 
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III. ISSUES AFFECI'IHG ANTARCTICA 
The Antarctic Treaty has proven remarkably effective 
since its ratification in June 1961. There remain, however, 
several issues which were difficult to address during 
negotiations in 1959, and were for all intents and ~urposes 
"frozen" at that time, as well as new issues which have 
emerged as the products of technological and scientific 
advances over the past three decades, which must be 
resolved. This chapter will address three of the most 
pressing, and potentially explosive issues currently facing 
the Antarctic Treaty System: the questions of sovereignty, 
conservation of mineral resources, and rising 
ecological/environmental concerns. These three issues are 
built, one upon the other. Without first establishing 
"sovereignty", the question of who owns the rights to 
mineral resources cannot be answered and, while not the 
entire problem, with the absence of mining or prospecting 
for minerals or oil, tha possibility of ecological damage is 
greatly lessened. In any event, sovereignty is, as it is in 
the field of international law, the linchpin from which the 
following issues £Volve. 
A. SOVEREIGNTY 
The establishment of sovereignty is the very backbone of 
international law and consequently, internationa :elations. 
20 
International law, as defined by Lassa Oppenheim, is "the 
name for the body of customary and treaty rules which are 
considered legally binding by States in their intercourse 
with each other. 11 3 2 Oppenheim added further the 
definition of "state" territory, which is "that ••• portion of 
the surface of the globe which is subjected to the 
sovereignty of the State," 3 3 and is crucial to the 
understanding of "sovereignty" in Antarctica. He later 
wrote, "The importance of State terri tory lies in the fact 
that it is the space within which the State exercises its 
supreme authority," 3 4 or sovereignty. Therefore 
sovereignty over territory is one of the most basic 
prerequisites of a nation state. There are several ways by 
which territorial sovereignty can be established. Oppenheim 
names five: cession, occupation, accretion, subjugation, and 
prescription, 3 5 while Louis Henkin, a Columbia University 
Law Professor, adds several others such as "conquest, 
consolidation, contiguity, and discovery. 11 3 6 Argentina 
provides examples of five separate aspects of international 
law with regard to its territorial claims in Antarctica. 
First, "under the principle of uti possidetis, ita 
32oppenheim, International Law, pp. 4-5. 
3 3Ibid. I p. 451. 
34Ibid., p. 452. 
35Ibid., p. 546. 
36Louis Henkin and others, International Law: cases and 
Materials, 2nd ed. (St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing 
Co., 1987), p. 1508. 
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possideatis, as you possessed, so may you possess, Argentina 
is the legal heir of the possessions of the king of 
S · n:37 paJ.n •••• This aspect goes back to the 15th century 
when Spain and Portugal, the "superpowers" of that century, 
divided the world between themselves. :3 a Later, when 
Argentina finally achieved independence in 1810, and was the 
"legal heir of the possessions of the king of Spain" in the 
Western Hemisphere, portions of Antarctica became 
possessions of Argentina. "Discovery" and "exploration" are 
two additional bases for claims of sovereignty, as are 
geographical proximity and geographical continuity.:39 In 
addition to these five legal bases, Argentines have also 
occupied Antarctica since 1904, by far the longest 
continuous occupation of Antarctica by any country, 4 0 and 
as such provides an additional basis for its territorial 
claims. 
On the other hand, the United States and the U.S.S.R. 
argue that Antarctica cannot be "occupied" in the true sense 
of the word. u.s. Secretary of State Hughes expressed this 
argument when in 1924, in a note to the Norwegian Minister, 
he wrote: 
37Jack Child, Antarctica and Soutb AMerican Geopolitics; 
Frozen Lebensraum (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1988), p. 
68. 
:3 a Ibid., p. 68. 
3 9It is argued that the Antarctic Antartandes are related 
to the South American Andes. 
40child, Antarctica and South American Geopolitics, p. 69. 
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In my op1n1on rights similar to those which in earlier 
cent11ries were based upon the acts of a discoverer, 
followed by occupation or settlement consummated at 
long and uncertain periods thereafter, are not capable 
of being acquired at the present time. Today, if an 
explorer is able to ascertain the existence of lands 
still unknown to civilization, his act of so-called 
discovery, coupled with a formal taking of possession, 
would have no significance, save as he might herald the 
advent of the settler; and where for climatic or other 
reason actual settlement would be an impossibility, as 
in the case of the Polar regions, such conduct on his 
part would afford frail support for a reasonable claim 
of sovereignty. 4 1. 
The Soviet Union also argued that sightings and claims 
established by its nationals, Bellingshausen and Lazarev, in 
the early 19th century would give the U.S.S.R. a basis for 
territorial claims, if it chose to exert such claims. The 
United States, while standing by its position of making no 
territorial claims, nor recognizing the claims of other 
nations, did make provisions to support a sovereignty claim, 
in the event that move proved advantageous or necessary. 
These provisions were usually made surreptitiously. For 
example in 1938, when Lincoln Ellsworth, a u.s. citizen, 
mounted a private expedition to Antarctica, he was asked "in 
strict confidence •.• to assert claims in the name of the 
United States ••• regardless of whether or not it lies within 
a sector or sphere of influence already claimed by any other 
country." 4 2 The reason for the secrecy surrounding this 
request is obvious as the United States did not want to 
41.oepartment of State, Foreign Relations of the United 
States. 1924, vol. 2, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1939), p. 519. 
42state, Foreign Relations 1938, val. 1, p. 972. 
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alarm nations which had previously established territorial 
claims in Antarctica. 4 3 
Disputes between several of the original 12 signatories 
with regard to overlapping territorial claims was one of the 
most difficult issues presented during the original 
negotiations. With Chile, Argentina, and the United Kingdom 
asserting claims to portions of the same terri tory, the 
stage was set for conflict. However, in keeping with the 
mandate that "it is in the interest of all mankind that 
Antarctica shall continue to be used exclusively for 
peaceful purposes and shall not become the scene or object 
of international discord" and as noted in Article IV, by 
signing the Treaty, the status quo with regard to 
territorial claims would be maintained for the life of the 
Treaty. In other words, no additional claims to Antarctica 
could be made, and those claims already in force would 
remain so. 4 4 Thus the sovereignty issue was put on hold 
for 30 years. 
The issue has become no less contentious with the 
passage of time. During the negotiations of the Conventions 
subsequent to the Antarctic Treaty, sovereignty remained the 
crucial stumbling block to be overcome. As Secretary of 
State Muskie noted in his letter of submittal on the 
4 3 Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United 
States. 193i, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1956), p. 13. 
4 4 TIAS 4780. 
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Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living 
Resources, "Because the claimant states consider that 
jurisdiction over marine resources derives from territorial 
sovereignty, the participants in the negotiation had to deal 
with their basic differences of view over the existence and 
nature of maritime jurisdiction in the Convention 
areas o "4 5 These differences were overcome by Article IV 
of the Convention, which again affirms, as in the Antarctic 
Treaty, ter.r ~ torial status would remain status quo. 
In addi t.ion to disputes between Treaty signatories, 
sovereignty in Antarctica faces challenges on several other 
fronts. First, the United Nations seeks to establish its 
legitimacy with regard to Antarctic affairs. Antarctica 
first appeared on the UN agenda in 1983, and has since 
appeared each year, accompanied by debates and resolutions. 
In 1987, two resolutions were adopted which "reaffirmed 
demands.o.for wider [UN] participation in the minerals 
negotiations, the involvement of the UN Secretary General in 
Antarctic Treaty System's operations, and the exclusion of 
South Africa [an original signatory member] from treaty 
meetings o "4 6 To date, the Antarctic Treaty Parties have 
withstood pressure to accede to UN demands, and as the 
45congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign R~lations, 
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Liying 
§f~urces, 96th Cong., 2d sess., 1980, p. viii and 8. 
Peter J. Beck, "Antarctica at the UN 1988: Seeking a 
Bridge of Understanding," Polar Record, October 1989, p. 
329. 
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number of Antarctic Treaty members grows (as with China and 
India), the probability of UN intervention is decreased. 
The UN Law of the Sea Convention, signed 10 December 
1982, in Jamaica, focuses a slightly different light on 
sovereignty claims in Antarctica. Article VI of the 
Antarctic Treaty states: "The provisions of the present 
Treaty shall apply to the tarea south of 60 degrees South 
Latitude, including all ice shelves, but nothing in the 
present Treaty shall prejudice or in any way affect the 
rights, or the exercise of the rights, of any State under 
international law with regard to the high seas within that 
area [author's italics]. n4 7 In effect, provisions of the 
1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) apply to 
Antarctic seas. This opens the way for legal disputes as to 
"territorial waters" or "exclusive economic zones", not only 
between the claimants to Antarctic territory, but also 
between territorial claimants and others because the ocean 
borders of the Antarctic land mass are open to question due 
to the composition of the Antarctic continent with its vast 
ice cover. 
sovereignty is the very essence of statehood. As such, 
questions associated around this issue will be contentious, 
controversial, and vigorously debated. If the Antarctic 
4 7TIAS 4780. 
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Treaty is brought up for review, it will be extremely 
difficult for a satisfactory solution to be found. 
B. MIHERAL RESOURCES 
The question of whether or not mineral resources exist 
in Antarctica, as well as the exploitation of such potential 
resources has been an especially troublesome issue for the 
Antarctic Treaty system. Antarctica is seen by some to 
contain " ••• fabulous deposits of iron, molybdenum, copper, 
silver, gold, manganese and possibly uranium •••. " 4 a 
Another statement, ~xpressing similar sentiments was made by 
Malaysia's Prime Minister Ma1"lathir when he said, "'I have 
heard the South Pole is made of gold and I want my piece of 
it. '" 4 9 The United States !~as made its share of similar 
conjectures with regard to Antarctic riches. In 1975, a 
Navy Captain was quoted as saying " ••• that a potential 45 
billion barrels of oil may be under the ice of 
Antarctica. n 5 0 This inaccurate statement was quickly 
clarified by the u.s. Office of Energy Resources. 5 1 These 
are but a few examples of the myths which surround Antarctic 
resources, and which only serve to fuel interest in 
~SRoberto Remo Bissio, ed. Third World Guide (Rio de 
Janeiro: Editora Terceiro Mundo, 1986), p. 500. 
49tne Guardian, 26 November 1988, quoted in Peter J. Beck, 
"A New Polar Factor in Internation6l Relations," World 
~~*An~~~~~i~9g~i l~ ~=timated as Enormous," Washington 
~, 3 March 1975. 
"Estimating the Antarctic Oil Resources," Washington 
~, 12 March 1975. 
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prospecting and development. As was noted by an Australian 
national during a workshop in Antarctica, 
Many exaggerated notions of the resource wealth of 
Antarctica have been expressed. The reality is that 
most of the information available is sgeculative and 
based largely on geological hypothesis.!52 
Thus based on conjecture, probability and incomplete 
information, Antarctica again becoroes the focus of 
diplomatic conflict. 
Unlike the "preservation and conservation of living 
resources" which was specifically addressed in Article IX of 
the Antarctic Treaty, mineral resources did not receive the 
same conservatory guarantees. This omission was based on 
reasons similar to those which affected the decision to 
effectively table the sovereignty issue. However, instead 
of "freezing" the issue as was done with sovereignty 
disputes, the issue of mineral resources was completely 
sidestepped. !5 3 This omission received renewed attention 
during the 1970s, for several reasons, among them "the 
dramatic rise in oil prices ••• and scientific drilling in the 
Ross Sea [which] stimulated further commercial 
!5 2 Richard A. Woolcott, "The Interaction Between the 
Antarctic Treaty System and the United Nations System," in 
Antarctic Treaty System; An Assessment. Proceedings of a 
Workshop Held at Beardmore South Field Camp. Antarctica. 
January 7-13. 1985 (Washington, D.C.: National Academy 
eress, 1986), pp. 386-387. 
!5 3 congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 
3ubcommittee on Oceans and International Environment, ~ 
Antarctic Policy, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975, p. 5. 
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interest. " 5 4 u.s. policy, during the 1970s, was one of 
"opposing actions by any nation with the purpose of 
commercial exploitation and exploration of Antarctic mineral 
resources and urging other nations to join the United States 
in such an interim policy •••• "55 At the same time, the 
u.s. opposed a moratorium proposed by other nations. 
The Antarctic Treaty Parties began negotiations in 1982 
on the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral 
Resource Activities (CRAMRA) I or the "Wellington 
Convention", so-called because the Convention was " •.. opened 
for signature at Wellington, [New Zealand] on 25 November 
1988. n5 6 
activity" 5 7 
Designed to n ••• manage mineral resource 
in Antarctica to include prospecting, 
exploration, and development, the Convention also prohibited 
mineral resource activity outside its purview (Article 3). 
Six years in negotiation, ratification of CRAMRA has met 
with unexpected resistance from environmental and 
conservation groups, as well as from the Australian, French, 
5 4 Congress, Off ice of Technology Assessment, Polar 
Prospects; A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1989), p. 9. 
5 5 congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, ~ 
~ifrctic Policy, p. 6. 
"SCAR Bulletin No. 94, July 1989: Final Act of the 
Fourth Special Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting on 
Antarctic Mineral Resources," Polar Record, July 1989, p. 
263. 
57peter J. Beck, "Convention on the Regulation of 
Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities: A Major Addition to 
the Antarctic Treaty System," Polar Record, January 1989, p. 
21. 
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and New Zealand governments which have reversed their 
original positions of support for the Convention. Opponents 
of the Convention view any discussion of mining in 
Antarctica an anathema, and instead advocate turning 
Antarctica into an international peace park or wilderness 
preserve. 5 a 
An interesting side note to the debate on the use of 
mineral resources is the fact that Antarctica's most 
abundant natural resource, ice, is specifically excluded 
from consideration in CRAMRA. 59 The possibility of 
utilizing Antarctic ice as a fresh water source has been 
examined at one time or another over the past several 
decades. In 1973 at the request of the National science 
Foundation, the Rand Corporation prepared a report which was 
"intended to provide background knowledge for potential 
users and suppliers of Antarctic icebergs, and for 
governments or agencies concerned with the development, 
regulation, or control of these valuable ice resources.nE>Cl 
The study concluded that: 1) Antarctic icebergs could 
provide fresh water to "areas close to deep seawater access 
routes" at a cost in energy and money less than that used in 
5 a "Fighting for Antarctica I" Europe, September 1989, pp. 
7-8. 
59scAR Bulletin No. 94, July 1989, Polar Record, July 
1989, p. 263. 
E>ClJ. L. Hult and N. c. Ostrander, Antarctic Icebergs As A 
Global Fresh Water Besource, R-1255-NSF (Santa Monica, 
California: The Rand Corporation, 1973), p. iii. 
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desalinization projects, water reclamation operations, or 
"interbasin water transfers of a few hundred miles"; 2) 
further research with regard to "potential societal and 
environmental impacts" would be required before large-scale 
harvesting of Antarctic icebergs was begun.61 The Global 
2000 Report to the President, a project commissioned by 
President Carter in 1977, "to study the 'probable changes in 
the world's population, natural resources, and environment 
through the end of the century'", noted the potential 
scarcity of fresh water and subsequent effects on the 
international community. 6 2 More recently, Soviet 
scientists reportedly "worked out a project of shipping 
Antarctica's icebergs to the shores of the Arabian 
peninsula •••• " by using satellites to spot the icebergs and 
tugboats to tow them.63 The issue of Antarctic ice will 
appear on the agenda of the :r:r::~ C :.;;..:i-;..1 ~i. ~..:. ., a Meeting, 
scheduled for 1991.6 4 This comes at an opportune time for 
the U.S. as Dr. Michael Hudlow, director of the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's Office of 
---------------------61 b'd I l. ., p. Vl.l.. 
6 2 u.s. Council on Environmental Quality and the Department 
of State, The Global 200 Report to the President; Entering 
the Twenty-First Century, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1980). 
63"Antarctic Icebergs Moved," Moscow World Service, 10 
January 1988, as cited in FBIS-SOY-88-016, 26 January 1988, 
i5 77. ~"SCAR Bulletin No. 97, April 1990: Recommendations 
Adopted by the XVth Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting 
Paris, 19-20 October 1990," Polar Record, April 1990, p. 
180. 
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Hydrology, in a recent press conference noted, "As we [U.S.] 
move toward the 21st century, short supplies of clean water 
could rival expensive oil as one of the nation's most 
serious concerns ••.• n 6 5 Clearly the issue of using 
Antarctic icebergs as a fresh water source has the potential 
to become as contentious as developing Antarctic mineral 
resources. 
C. ECOLOGICAL AHD BMVIROIOIERTAL COIICERHS 
"Ecological and environmental" issues encompass a number 
of issues and have grown increasingly import~nt in the world 
as a whole, and in Antarctica in particular. These issues 
are important not only for their obvious environmental 
impact, but also because of the way in which consultative 
members view these issues and the way these perceptions 
affect the ATS as a whole. Recent discussions of global 
warming have focused attention on Antarctica and raised 
public awareness to the effects of all types of pollution. 
In addition, environmental watchgroups, such as Greenpeace, 
have forced governments to defend their environmental 
actions which in some cases have been detrimental to 
Antarctica's ecosystem. These two issues, meteorological 
studies and manmade pollution are two potent issues on the 
Antarctic agenda. 
6!5nu.s. Faces Acute Water Shortage in 90's, Government 
Expert Says," New York Times, 23 November 1990, p. CS. 
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1. Meteorological Studies 
As the result of a 1974 report by two researchers, 
M. J. Molina and F. s. Rowland, the late 1970s saw a rise in 
concern over fluorocarbons and their effect in the 
atmosphere. Subsequent scientific analysis and observations 
supported the Molina-Rowland thesis, which stated that 
chemical reactions caused by fluorocarbons in the atmosphere 
were depleting the ozone layer, and that the catalyst agent, 
the fluorocarbons had an extremely long lifetime. Little 
progress in addressing this issue resulted from the study 
until 1984, when the jolting discovery was made of a huge 
hole in the ozone layer over Antarctica. With this 
discovery, Antarctic reaearch and the necessity of 
maintaining Antarctica's relatively pollution-free 
environment received renewed interest from around the world. 
With public fears regarding the ozone, came renewed interest 
in "global warming" and the greenhouse effect. This 
interest spilled over into a movement for even greater 
control in Antarctica so that the scientific "baseline" its 
environment provided could be protected. 
As with any environmental issue, some nations are more 
concerned than others. Those in the Southern Hemisphere are 
noticeably more interested in Antarctica's effects on 
weather as these nations experience any deviations to a 
greater degree than those in the Northern Hemisphere. Also, 
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souther11 Hemispheric countries recognize the limited 
information available with regard to the Antarctic effect on 
the ocean currents which affect their economies directly 
through the fishing industry, as well as indirectly through 
severe weather changes. As one Brazilian official pointed 
out in underscoring his nation's interest in Antarctica: 
No scientific expertise is needed to understand that the 
climatic phenomena that powerfully interfere with the 
economy of the center-south regions of Brazil have their 
origin in Antarctica. It is also easy to see the 
importance of antarctic waters in ocean processes along 
Brazilian coast •••• 6 6 
Results of the relatively recent meteorological studies 
which are conducted in Antarctica have much to offer the 
international community. The need to maintain the 
"pollution-free laboratory" of Antarctica, however, 
continues to receive different priority among those nations 
in the decision-making process. 
2. Manaade Pollution 
As stated in Chapter I, Man has been coming to 
Antarctica since the 1700s. And since that time, has been 
leaving a legacy of trash, wreckage, and garbage. As Dr. 
Peter Wilkniss, Division Director of Polar Programs, 
National Science Foundation6 7 (NSF) testified before 
Congress: 
6 6L. F. Macedo de Soares Guimaraes, "The Antarctic Treaty 
system from the Perspective of a New Consultative Party," 
~~rctic Treaty System: An Assessment, p. 338. 
The United States' scientific organization in 
Antarctica. 
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In exam~n~ng environmental problems caused by increasing 
human activity in the Antarctic, the following 
observations apply: Any human intrusion and 
accompanying means of life support alter the pristine 
nature of the local environment •••• The dry, cold desert 
climate of the Antarctic preserves debris of human 
physical occupation for centuries. The Antarctic 
terrestrial environment is virtually devoid of microbial 
activity. Decomposition of degradable organic waste is 
slow, or virtually absent, and entrapment in ice or snow 
of waste matter significantly increases the persistence, 
over time, of discarded matter.6B 
In such an environment, and with little oversight, many 
environmentally unsound principles have been practiced over 
the years. The ATP did include as an agenda item at their 
biennial meetings, "Man's impact on the Antarctic 
environment." However, until environmental groups such as 
Greenpeace and the Environmental Defense Fund publicized the 
extent of manmade pollution in Antarctica--such as "pouring 
raw sewage into the sea," toxic chemical wastes, and leaking 
fuel tank3--cleanup efforts w~ ~e marginal. 6 9 "The waters 
right off ••• [the United States' McMurdo Station] are 
reportedly more polluted with substances such as heavy 
metals and PC13s than any similar stretch of water in the 
u.s. "7 0 As one National Science Foundation member noted, 
"'The negative press made us accelerate our cleanup'" , and 
EiBcongress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, Science and 
Transportation, Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and 
Space, Protecting Antarctica's Environment, lOlst Cong., 1st 
sess., 1989, p. 44, 
6 9Michael Tobias, "On Leaving It Alone: The Case for an 
Untainted Antarctica," Greenpeace, 1988, Vol. 13, No. 1, p. 
8. 
7 °Michael D. Lemonick, "Antarctica," ~' 15 January 
1990, p. 61. 
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the NSF hopes "to correct sins of the past. 117 1 ATP 
concern has not been with environmental cleanup, but rather 
with a broad mandate to "refrain from activities having an 
inherent tendency to modify the Antarctic environment unless 
appropriate steps have been taken to foresee the probable 
modifications and to exercise appropriate controls with 
respect to harmful environmental effects; ... [as well as] 
continue to monitor the Antarctic environment and to 
exercise their responsibility for informing the world 
community of any significant changes in the Antarctic Treaty 
Area caused by man's activities. "7 2 Until non-
governmental agencies were able to finance expeditions to 
Antarctica, there were no unbiased observers in Antarctica 
to determine if in fact the ATP were notifying the world 
community of the environmental effects of their presence in 
the region. 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
The issues which have been examined each have the 
potential to disrupt the Treaty System. The intensity by 
which each issue is viewed by a particular nation varies 
greatly, but none of the issues is without controversy. The 
manner in which they may finally be resolved is at the 
71"The World's Frozen Clean Room," Business Week, 22 
January 1990. 
72scAR Bulletin No. 58, January 1978, "Report of the Ninth 
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, London, 1977," Polar 
Record, January 1978, p. 93. 
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center of preparation for an Antarctic Treaty review. It is 
not a question "If" these issues will come up again, it is 
"When", and will the u.s. have a well-defined position from 
which to negotiate? 
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:IV. NEGOTIATING POSITIONS OF PARTICIPAIITS 
Negotiation can be described as "the use of information 
and power to affect behavior within a 'web of tension'"· ~3 
There are three crucial elements in any negotiation--time, 
power, and information. ~ 4 The ability to determine 
negotiating positions is not an easy task in any situation. 
If an adversary's position could be easily learned, the 
neqotiatine} process would proceed rapidly, as the final 
~sition to be taken would already be known. In a sense, 
the negotiating process could be dismissed and the "bottom 
lines" of each party either accepted or rejected. 
Determining the negotiating positions of Antarctic Treaty 
Parties is even more difficult, as most of their meetings 
are conducted in private (therefore, information is 
limited), and only the final reports of the meetings are 
published. Information for this chapter was found in 
newspaper and magazine articles and interviews, government 
publications, and significant works by authors actively 
involved in the political process represented by the ATS. 
The positions of the consultative parties must provide the 
initial point of view to be examined as their positions most 
directly affect the outcome of any negotiation. Non-
7 3Herb Cohen, You Can Negotiate AnYthing (New York: Bantam 
~oks, 1980), p. 15. 
4Ibid., p. 50. 
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consultative parties, as well as countries not involved in 
the ATS, too, have roles to play in any future negotiations 
and also require analysis. The positions of nongovernmental 
agencies is another factor which must also be considered as 
a U.S. negotiating position is formulated. Consultative 
parties provide the beginning point. 
A. CONSULTATIVE PARTIES 
~onsultative parties to the Antarctic Treaty include the 
original 12 signatories, as well as an additional nine 
countries which have "conducted significant scientific 
research in Antarctica", and have been voted (unanimously) 
into the ATS. These positions will be briefly examined, 
beginning with the original 12 (less the u.s. which will 
appear later in this section). 
1. Argentina 
Argentina has a long and extensive history in 
Antarctica and has been, along with its South American 
neighbor, Chile, one of the most vocal Treaty members. The 
Argentine "official" claim to portions of Antarctica was 
made 15 July 1939, and has been continually bolstered over 
the years by every means available. Small colonies have 
been established, babies have been born in "Argentine 
Antarctica", sovereignty exercised, all to further solidify 
Argentina's claims in the Antarctic. 
important concept in South American 
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"Geopolitics" is an 
1 i terature, and its 
~-- -- ----~--
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
effects are evident in Argentina's (as well as Chile's) 
pol:icj P.S in 14ntarctica. ~r.hol ar JRck Child wrote that ir. 
examining "Southern Cone Antarctic geopolitics", one must 
"stress that geopolitics is really the relationship between 
power politics and geography •••• Thus, we would have to add 
factors of national power (including military ones) and a 
strong dose of patriotism and even chauvinism. 11 7 5 This 
aspect must be evaluated in any discussion of Treaty 
changes. 
An additional factor which was relevant during initial 
treaty negotiations in the case of Argentina, as well as 
other Southern Hemispheric nations such as Chile, Australia, 
New Zealand, and South Africa, was the fear that the Soviet 
Union would establish military bases in Antarctica--bases 
from which missiles could be fired, reaching points in the 
Southern Hemisphere. This fear has been overtaken by 
technology, as deployed Soviet nuclear submarines can now 
launch missiles which are capable of reaching any point in 
the world. South Hemispheric countries may not want Soviet 
(or any other) military bases in Antarctica, but the reason 
can no longer be attributed to fear of nuclear missile 
bases. 
75Jack Child, Antarctica and South American Geopolitics; 




a.~ n-.,e of Great Britain's fermer color.~€=, .!..ustralia 
has understandably supported many of Great Britain's 
positions with regard to Antarctic matters. In recent 
years, however, Australia has increasingly taken a different 
point of view from that of Great Britain or the u.s. The 
recent discussion of the minerals convention provides 
insights into the Australian position toward Antarctica. In 
1988 Australia's Foreign Minister Evans noted that in 
evaluating the proposed minerals convention, "the 
government ••• would take into account its principal Antarctic 
objectives, which include keeping the region free from 
strategic and political confrontation, preserving 
Australia's sovereignty over the Australian Antarctic 
territory, protecting the Antarctic environment, and taking 
advantage of the special opportunities offered for 
scientific research. n 7 6 The Australian government's 
initial position taken in 1988, has not softened since that 
time. It has instead taken an even harsher stance against 
the minerals convention, to the dismay of many who had 
already signed the Wellington Convention, such as New 
Zealand, the United States, Britain, Argentina, Chile, and 
76nAustralia in No Hurry to Sign," Hong Kong AFP, 25 
November 1988, as cited in FBIS-EAS-88-228, 28 November 
1988, p. 1. 
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Norway.?'?' Subsequent reports and news articles chronicled 
the Convention's debate in Australia, among its 
conservationists, government, and neighbors, as well as 
between the signatories themselves. At one point, a u.s. 
State Department official said that Australia would "cave in 
and sign the convention •••• "; Australia's Prime Minister 
Hawke made it very clear that this would not be the case, 
and instead expressed optimism that Australia's proposed 
"wilderness park plan" would be accepted by the ATS. ?' B 
The significance of this issue with regard to the Antarctic 
Treaty is that Australia has taken a very pro-environmental 
position against any type of mining, in direct opposition to 
the u.s. position. Some see the "disunity" within the ATS, 
as created by debate over CRAMRA, as having significant 
implications for "the Antarctic Treaty system as a whole in 
the 1990s ••• " in that it is likely to "herald a review of 
the Antarctic Treaty in the period after 1991."?'~ 
3. BelCJiUII 
While not a territorial claimant, Belgium considered 
its early explorations of Antarctica ample enough reason for 
?'?'"Australia Asked Not to Veto Antarctic Accord," 
Melbourne overseas Service, 23 May 1989, as cited in FBIS-
~ii89-100, 25 May 1989, p. 60. 
"Hawke Wants Antarctic Declared Wilderness Park," Hong 
Kong AFP, 13 September 1989, as cited in FBIS-EA89-177, 14 
Se~ember 1989, p. 67. 
?' s. K. N. Blay and B. M. Tsamenyi, "Australia and the 
Convention for the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource 
Activities (CRAMRA)," Polar Record, July 1990, p. 201. 
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it to be included in the original negotiations of the 
Evji:Ont-n~Jly the U.S. agreed: as 
Belgium was actively involved in the IGY in Antarctica, and 
Belgium was amcnq the 11 nations invited to participate in 
Antarctic Treaty negotiations. Though Belgium is a small 
nation with limited international influence, it has taken a 
strong stand against mining in Antarctica, describing 
"CRAMRA as 'dangerous and inappropriate'", while also 
passing legislation which "stop[s] any Belgian national or 
corporation from mining or prospecting in Antarctic ... a 1 
It can be charged that the Belgium government can take the 
"high moral" ground in Antarctica's case, as Belgium has not 
been involved in any significant Antarctic research for some 
time, primarily due to lack of funds. a 2 Nevertheless, its 
status as an original signatory give it a certain power 
which countries acceding to the Treaty do not enjoy. 
4. Chile 
Chile bases its claims to Antarctic territory on the 
same principles as Argentina--discovery, occupation, 
possession, and proximity. A recent meeting of Chile's 
Antarctic Policy Council provided an opportunity for Chile 
to " ••• reiterate the three traditional guidelines of the 
Chilean Antarctic policy: to defend Chile's sovereign 
a<>state, Foreign Relations 1948, vol. 1, p. 1010. 
a 1uobart Mercury, 7 July 1989, as cited in "Australia and 
the Convention ••• ," Polar Record, p. 195. 
8 2Beck, International Politics, p. 193. 
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rights, to defend the Antarctic Treaty and the system it 
created. and to protect the environment and the 
ecosystems ... a 3 As the "first South American country to 
make an Antarctic claim,"~~ Chile defines its jurisdiction 
in Antarctica on the basis of a study completed by the 
Chilean Antarctic Commission (CAT) in 1940.~!5 Portions of 
Antarctic terri tory claimed by Chile are also claimed by 
Argentina, an issue exacerbated by a history of past 
territorial disagreements.~ 6 The two nations have, on 
occasion, shelved the differences between themselves to 
present a uni-c.ed front against threats from outside their 
region. Both countries espouse similar policies toward 
Antarctica, evident during a recent Chilean Antarctic Policy 
Council meeting, at which the participants "reiterate[d] ~he 
three traditional guidelines of the Chilean Antarctic 
policy: to defend Chile's sovereign rights, to defend tne 
Antarctic Treaty and the system it has created, and to 
protect the environment and the ecosystems."~ 7 Chile 
~ 3 Francisco Eterovic, "Antarctic Policy Council Meets at 
Marsh Base," El Mercurio 20 January 1990, as cited in FBIS-
~90-028, 9 February 1990, p. 42. 
Philip Kelly and Jack Child, eds. Geopolitics of tbe 
Southern Cone and Aotarctica (Boulder, Colorado and London: 
L~nne Rienner Publishers, 1988), p. 176. 
~!5Luis H. Merico, Aotarctica; Cbile's Claim (Washington, 
D.C.: National Defense University, 1987), p. 93. 
~ 6 see Howard T. Pittman's description of the Beagle 
Channel dispute in "Applied Geopolitics in Chile," Kelly and 
Child, eds., Geopolitics of the Southern Cone. ~~"Antarctic Policy Council Meets at Marsh Base,"~ 
Kercurio, 20 January 1990, as cited in FBIS-LAT-90-028, 9 
February 1990, p. 42. 
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continues to see itself as a prominent player in Antarctic 
politic~. 
5. France 
The French territorial claim is based on the 
discovery of, what has come to be known as, "Adelie Land", 
in 1840, by the French explorer, Dumont d 'Urville. 
Subsequently, action was taken to formalize the claim 
through possession. a 8 France has not been one of the more 
active ATS members. Its territorial claim is the smallest of 
those made, and it maintains only one year-round research 
station. However, the reversal of its original position of 
support for CRAMRA has brought its Antarctic policies into 
the spotlight. In a joint statement made with Australia in 
June 1989, it was noted that the two countries' agreement on 
Antarctica was "part of an initiative being discussed ••• to 
launch a comprehensive campaign to help protect the world 
environment." a 9 France's stated position of protecting 
the Antarctic environment has been regarded with suspicion 
by some environmental groups, which note that France's 
construction of an airstrip at its Adelie Land base is 
unnecessary and extremely disruptive to the natural 
aastate, Foreign Relations 1939, vol. 2, p. 4. 
a 9 "Mi tterrand, Australia's Hawke on Antarctic Mining," 
Melbourne overseas Service, 20 June 1989, as cited in FBIS-
WEU-89-118, 21 June 1989, p. 8. 
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environment. 9 0 The "independent" nature of French 
politics makes it difficult to predict their position if the 
Treaty were reviewed. 
6. Japan 
Japan was forced to renounce all territorial claims 
in Antarctica as a result of the Treaty of Peace, signed in 
September 1951. It has however, maintained an active role 
in Antarctic affairs, established by its participation in 
the Third International Geophysical Year. Economically, 
Japan is extensively involved in whaling and fishing in the 
southern oceans, as is the soviet Union. Japan's intensive 
whaling in Antarctic waters has been, on occasion, a 
sensitive issue between the U.s. and Japan with sanctions 
threatened by the u.s. against the Japanese fishing 
fleet. 9 .l.. Japan's interest in Antarctica is evidenced by 
its extensive research activity. Japan does, however, 
appear to maintain a subdued profile in regard to public 
statements concerning Antarctic resources. It could be 
inferred from a recent article written by Japanese Prime 
Minister Kaifu, in which he reiterated his "goals of the new 
international order", that the continued enforcement of the 
9 °Greenpeace International, "Report on a visit to Dumont 
d'Urville, Antarctica," Polar Record, January 1990, pp. 51-
53. 
9.l..nu.s. Urged To Reconsider Whaling Sanctions," Tokyo 
KYODO, 20 February 1988, as cited in FBIS-EAS-88-034, 22 
February 1988, p. 3. 
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Antarctic Treaty would actively suppor-t- a::1d enhance those 
goals. 9 2 
7. New Zealand 
New Z~aland's territorial claims came about as the 
result of annexation of portions of terri tory claimed by 
Great Britain. New Zealand has provided the last stopping 
off place for U.S. expeditions for at least 50 years, and as 
such is quite significant in u.s. Antarctic policy. The 
continuation of New Zealand's support is important for u.s. 
Antarctic operations, as there are few alternatives, namely 
Chile or Argentina. With regard to New Zealand's position 
on mineral resources in Antarctica, as it was the depository 
for CRAMRA, New Zealand was initially quite distressed when 
its neighbor, Australia, indicated its unwillingness to sign 
the Convention. Since that time, "the New Zealand 
Government has decided to put aside consideration of 
ratification of the Antarctic Minerals Convention, and focus 
on creative ways of breaking the impasse which currently 
exists over mining in Antarctica and the development of an 
environmental protection regime for the Antarctic 
environment. ti 9 3 This policy was announced in February 
1990 by New Zealand's Prime Minister Palmer. 
92Toshiki Kaifu, "Japan's Vision," Foreign Policy, Fall 
1990, p. 31. 
93nAntarctic Update," New Zealand External Relations 
Review, January-March 1990, p. 19. 
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8. Norway 
Norway's territorial claim was established in 1939, 
on the basis of past explorations. Norwegians had for years 
been whaling in Antarctic waters, and it was the Norwegian 
Roald AmundRen who "discovered" the South Pole. Author 
Peter Beck contends that Norway's actions in Antarctjca are 
tempered by its fear of Soviet actions in the Arctic, "on 
account of the long-standing tendency to interpret legal and 
other inter-connections between the two polar regions.n94 
This implied if the Soviets were allowed to establish 
military bases in Antarctica, they could do the same in the 
Arctic, much too close for Norwegian comfort. If this is an 
accurate assessment, recent changes in the international 
environment should ease Norwegian fears. 
9. SOuth Africa 
South Africa regards Antarctica as terra nullius and 
therefore, makes no claim, nor recognizes t'he claims of 
others in Antarctica. As with Belgium and the U.S.S.R., 
which were excluded from preliminary discussions of 
Antarctica because they had not advanced claims to 
Antarctica, South Africa made known its interest in 
participating in "any organization or machinery which may be 
devised to control and administer the Antarctic 
Continent. n9 5 In the final invitation issued by President 
9 4seck, International Politics, p. 40. 
95state, Foreign Relations 1948, vol. 1, p. 1009. 
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Eisenhower in 1958, South Africa was included as a 
participant, and become one of the original signatories. In 
1959, South African membership presented few problems, but 
in the 1980s, the issue of apartheid made its participation 
difficult in some cases. In particular, South African 
participation within the ATS has provided opponents of the 
Antarctic Treaty fuel to challenge the system as a whole. 
In 1986, opponents of the Treaty sponsored three resolutions 
in the UN with regard to Antarctic Treaty System, one of 
these "indicated concern about the continuing participation 
of South Africa as an ATCP and urged other ATCPs to exclude 
it at the earliest possible date.n96 
10. soviet Union 
During initial discussions of Antarctica, a driving 
point of u.s. policy thinking was to keep the soviet Union 
from being involved in any way. As Acting Secretary of 
State Lovett wrote to the British Ambassador in 1948, " ••• no 
occasion should be given to the Soviet Union to participate 
in an Antarctic settlement or administration. "9 7 The 
U.S.S.R. however, was not to be so summarily excluded. In 
February 1949, the All-Union Geographic Society of the 
U.S.S.R. "passed a resolution stating that any decision 
affecting the Antarctic regime without Soviet participation 
9 6p. J. Beck, "The United Nations and Antarctica 1986," 
~~r Record, September 1987, p. 687. 
State, Foreign Relations 1948, vol. 1, p. 974. 
49 
would lack legal force and the USSR had every justification 
not to recognize such decisions. n9 a The Soviet Union 
established its right to participate in discussions 
regarding the Antarctic based on "discovery" in 1819-21, by 
Russian navigators, Bellingshausen and Lazarev, and was also 
interested because of its whaling industry.99 The soviet 
Union took the position, similar to that of the United 
States, that it could make territorial claims if it chose to 
do so, while at the same time, it did not recognize the 
territorial claims of others. During Antarctic Treaty 
negotiations the Soviets were accused of being 
"intransigent" on several issues, such as rules of 
procedure, topics, and participation. The Soviets were the 
only delegation which "argued strongly for full 
participation, even in the preparatory talks, of all 
countries that expressed interest." 1 0 0 The Soviet 
delegation also supported "unanimity" in voting procedures, 
instead of the "majority" which the u.s. and United Kingdom 
advocated. 101 The "unanimous", consensus rule was 
adopted in Article X11. on a more ro~ent note, there have 
been calls in the soviet press for a "Change of Policy on 
Antarctica." The author argues that by signing CRAMRA, the 
9Sstate, Foreign Relations 1949, vol 1., p. 794. Bush, 
~\Jrctica and International Law, vol. 3, p. 207. 
State, Foreign Relations 1950, vol. 1, p. 912. 
10 Opeter J. Beck, Preparatory Meetings for the Antarctic 
Trea~ 1958-59," Polar Record, September 1985, p. 657. 
:L 0 Ibid. I p. 662. 
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Soviet Union is taking a short view of a long-term problem. 
He advocates joining France and Australia's stand against 
mining and prospecting. 1 0 2 This view is in contrast to 
the perhaps more realistic view taken by another Soviet when 
discussing the mining in Antarctica. 
'Expensive? Very! And there would also be the 
transportation of minerals to, for example, Japan, which 
is almost devoid of natural resources. But who know how 
much that same ton of coal will cost on the world market 
in a hundred years?! ' 1 0 3 
The soviet position, as in the past, proves difficult to 
anticipate. 
11. United Kinqdo• 
Britain has been one of the most active participants 
in Antarctic exploration, research, and "presence" since 
Cook's discovery in the late 1700s. The United Kingdom was 
the primary party with which the u.s. established Antarctic 
policy, usually to the detriment of the two other major 
players, Chile and Argentina. In addition to the standing 
territorial disputes between Chile, Argentina, and Great 
Britain, the British government expressed concern, in 1948, 
"that on strategic grounds it would not be desirable that 
10 2A. Bovin, "Political Observer's Opinion: The Antarctic 
Must Be Saved!", Moscow IZVESTIYA, 8 December 1989, as cited 
incJ~S-SQV-89-238, p. 12. 1o. Popov, "Zachem Lyudyam Antarktida? (Why Do People 
Need Antarctica?)," Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya 
(Socialist Industry), 14 August 1977, p. 4, as cited in 
Soyiet Perceptions of tbe South Pacific and Antarctic 
Regions: An Examination of Unclassified Soyiet Sources, 
Defense Intelligence Agency, January 1980, p. 76. 
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countries like Argentina and Chile, in the light of their 
record in world War TWo, control islands which could 
dominate the open water passage south of Cape Horn.••1o 4 
The u.s. did not concur with this evaluation, but did 
maintain closer ties regarding Antarctica with the British, 
than either of its two hemispheric neighbors. The u.s. and 
Great Britain have worked closely together in the past on 
most Antarctic issues, and there is no reason to assume that 
relationship will ~""ange. 
12. other Consultative Parties' Positions 
There are an additional nine nations which have 
gained consultative status and have thus, earned the right 
to vote on Antarctic Treaty matters. These nations are 
Poland, Brazil, China, India, unified Germany, Spain, 
Sweden, Italy and Uruguay. With the exception of Poland, 
which was granted consult~-ive status in 1977, these nations 
were accorded consultative status within the past ten years, 
five of them within the last five years. In many cases, 
their positions on Antarctica are difficult to ascertain, as 
the historical perspective is limited. As with the 
positions of the original signatories, newspaper and 
magazine interviews, public statements by government 
officials, as well as works by Antarctic experts, provide 
1 0 4 State, Foreign Relations 1948, vol. 1, p. 963. 
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the basis from which to formulate and articulate these 
countries' current positions on Antarctica and the ATS. 
Poland had wanted to be included as one of the original 
signatories but was forced, instead to accede to the Treaty 
in June 1961. Poland was eventually able to fulfill the 
requirement of establishing and maintaining a year-round 
research station in Antarctica, and became a consultative 
party in 1977. The Federal Republic of Germany became the 
next consultative party in 1981, followed in 1983 by two 
leaders in the developing world, India and Brazil. The 
addition of these two nations greatly affected Treaty 
critics, which had previously viewed the ATS as a system of 
the "haves" keeping out the "have nots". From 1985 through 
1988, six other countries attained consultative status: the 
People's Republic of China, Uruguay, the German Democratic 
Republic, Italy, Spain and Sweden. Only one consultative 
meeting, which was held in Paris in october 1989, has been 
conducted under this particular set of members, therefore 
again, little historical data is available. on the other 
hand, as the possibility of review approaches with the 1991 
deadline, numerous articles have been written, some of which 
provide insights into these countries' positions on 
Antarctica. Wei -Chin Lee, a Chinese scholar has, despite 
"The secrecy of the minerals regime negotiations and the 
scarce publicity concerning Chinese Antarctic activities 
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[which] make a reliable examination of the Chinese position 
difficult •••• ", nevertheless determined that with regard to 
Antarctica, the "PRC maintains a fairly internationalist 
line and favors U.N. involvement." 10 5 China is not the 
only consultative party to take an "internationalist line". 
India has also indicated its "global perspective" with its 
support of the "world park" concept advocated by Australia 
and France. Italy, too, has indicated its support of the 
"wilderness reserve" concept, 10 6 a concept compatible 
with statements made when Italy became a consultative member 
in 1987. At that time, Italy indicated its admission into 
the ATS was a "'gratifying but well deserved recognition of 
the high level of research in various scientific fields 
Italy conducts in the Antarctic.' ••• which aims at the 
protection of the ecosystem of an environment fundamental 
for life on the planet.n107 Brazilian geopoliticians, on 
the other hand support their South American neighbors' 
positions when they "speak of a three-pronged national 
interest in Antarctica: security, ecology, and 
economics. " 1 0 8 This appears to be the more pragmatic 
----------------------
105wei-Chin Lee, "China and Antarctica: So Far and Yet So 
Near," Asian Suryey, June 1990, p. 583. 
1 0 6 "Italy To Endorse Antarctic Wilderness Plan," Rome 
AHSA, 11 October 1989, as cited in FBIS-WEQ-89-197, 13 
october 1989, p. 1. 
1 0 7 "Italy Takes Part in Antarctic Treaty Meeting," Rome 
AHSA, 8 October 1987, as cited in FBIS-WEU-87-197, 13 
October 1987, p. 14. 
1 0 SKelly and Child, South Alnerican Geopolitics and 
Antarctica, p. 199. 
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view, which leaves all options open for Brazilian 
politicians and statesmen. 
B. ACCEDING PARTIES 
Acceding nations are, not unexpectedly, less vocal in 
their positions on Antarctic issues. Unable to vote, and 
only recently permitted to attend consultative meetings as 
observers, 1 0 9 acceding nations' remarks are tempered by 
the knowledge that they can only become "consultative 
partios" if, after conducting substantive scientific 
research in Antarctica, they are unanimously approved by the 
current consultative party membership. The incentive to 
"conform" is considerable. 
C. •THE OUTSIDERS• 
Countries outside the Antarctic Treaty system have been 
extremely vocal in criticizing the Treaty. The UN has 
provided the most accessible forum for this criticism. 
Peter J. Beck has written extensively on the relationship 
between the U.N. and the Antarctic Treaty Parties since 
1983, when "The Question of Antarctica" appeared on the U.N. 
agenda. As Beck noted, "Since 1983 the international 
community has moved from dialogue on the 'Question of 
Antarctica' towards polarization, because of the contrasting 
views of the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs) 
10 9scAR Bulletin, "Fifth Special Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Meetinq, Canberra, 1983, 11 Polar Record, January 
1984, pp. 102-103. 
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and other governments on the future management of the area, 
the conduct of the minerals regime negotiations, and South 
African participation in the ATS." 11 0 This situation has 
not significantly changed. 
D. U.S. POSITION 
1. Past 
u.s. policy in Antarctica has vacillated over the 
past century. As with all policy issues, changes in the 
Administration brought changes in Antarctic policy. 
Bush identifies 
W.M. 
"four official attitudes this century by the United 
States to claims [the sovereignty issue]: the period up 
to 1924 when it seemed to have no formulated policy: 
from 1924 to the mid 1930's when it came close to 
denying t:h~ possibility of claims by any country to 
Antratica [~]: from the mid 1930's to the beginning of 
the International Geophysical Year in 1957-58 when it 
encouraged its nationals to claim territory on its 
behalf and lastly from the International Geophysical 
Year to the present when it has set its face against 
making a claim and instead has given full support to an 
international regime of co-o~ration and a moratorium of 
claims and bases of claims. " 1 1 
In the late 1940s, when Antarctica was becoming more of an 
issue, the u.s. evaluated Antarctica's "value". Secretary 
of Defense Forrestal and the Joint Chiefs of Staff thought 
it was of "little apparent strategic value to the United 
States now •••• however, ••• its future strategic value 
110peter J. Beck, "Another Sterile Annual Ritual? The 
United Nations and Antarctica 1987," Polar Record, July 
1988 p. 207. 
111. Bush, Antarctica and International j&w, vol. 3, p. 
420. 
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(including natural resources) to the United States or to our 
[U.S.] most probable enemies cannot be accurately predicted 
at this time. 1111 2 Secretary Forrestal continued that 
"from a military standpoint, two factors appear to be of 
paramount importance in determining United States policy 
with respect to the Antarctic. " 11 3 These two factors 
were Antarctica's proximity to likely u.s. allies, such as 
Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Argentina and Chile, 
if a war broke out. And second, control of Cape Horn, which 
would become critical if the Panama canal were closed. In a 
later memo, the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted their main 
concern was that Ant~rctica be controlled by friendly powers 
and exclude from control any probable enemies.114 Based 
on these and other assessments, the u.s. sought to have 
international control established over Antarctica. This, as 
has been previously stated, met with marked resistance from 
most countries with territorial claims in Antarctica. 
2. Present 
u.s. goals in Antarctica have remained basically the 
same since the Treaty was signed. These are "to maintain 
the Antarctic Treaty, to ensure that the continent continues 
to be used only for peaceful purposes, to foster cooperative 
research contributing to the solution of regional and world-
112state Foreign Relations 1948, vol. 1, p. 971-72. 
113Ibid.: p. 972. 
114rbid., p. 991. 
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wide problems, and to ensure the equitable and wise use of 
living and nonliving resources. n .1 .1 5 on a more 
"capitalistic" list, the goals are to maintain the region as 
a zone of peace, preserve freedom of scientific research and 
the Antarctic environment, and to provide "an opportunity 
for u.s. private industry to exploit Antarctic resources if 
and when it becomes feasible and appropriate. u.J.. 16 Hence, 
the u.s. support of CRAMRA, which the u.s. signed but was 
not able to ratify. 1 .1 7 
3. FUture 
For the foreseeable future, the United States wants 
Antarctica to remain status quo. Until or unless, a major 
oil field, or some equally significant resource, is 
discovered, it is in the u.s. best interests that the Treaty 
remain in effect, as it has been a remarkably strong 
stabilizing factor in international politics. If, however, 
a review is called for in 1991, the u.s. should be prepared 
to address the following issues. First, the question of 
sovereignty may be blown wide open. If it appears that the 
current consensus cannot be maintained and that those 
countries with territorial claims intend to operate outside 
the ATS, the u.s. must establish its territorial claims, for 
115senate, Protecting Antarctica's Environment, p. 47. 
116office of Technology Assessment, Polar Prospects; A 
Minerals Treaty for Antarctica (Washington, D.c.: Government 
Pr~~ng Office, 1989), p. 8. 
1 Shabecoff, "U.S. Seeks Ban," p. A4. 
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which the foundations were laid in the 1930s and 1940s. 
This step is to "shock" ATCPs into taking a second look at 
the consequences of abandoning the current system. The u.s. 
can always suspend its claims if a consensus can be reached. 
Second, the u.s. should reevaluate the position of the UN in 
Antarctic matters. Although not supportive of the "Heritage 
of Mankind" concept, the u.s. may find that, in light of the 
potential disintegration of the ATS, that the UN position 
may be the most advantageous in the long run. If conflict 
could be avoided in Antarctica, the price of UN involvement 
might be worth paying. These two options, establishing 
territorial claims and/or allowing UN participation, are in 
the event of the worst case scenario, the Treaty fails. If 
however, in 1991 the Treaty is extended, but certain 
provisions are added or changed, the U. s. should consider 
the following issues, keeping in mind the three crucial 
components of negotiation--time, power, knowledge. First, 
the u.s. suffers under time constraints, only in that 
another country may, during "scientific research", discover 
mineral resources in quantities significant enough for the 
world market. The feasibility of mining and transporting 
cost-effective quantities of minerals remains unlikely for 
the next several decades at least. The u.s. "power" 
component has somewhat diminished since negotiations in 
1958-59, as the number of countries interested and capable 
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of participating in Antarctica has grown. This aspect 
requires a certain sensitivity to developing and newly 
developing countries' concerns. Knowledge of Antarctica is 
an aspect in which the u.s. excels, as do Japan, the 
U.S.S.R., and Great Britain. These countries have the most 
extensive Antarctic research facilities and the funds and 
technology to support scientific research. Perhaps if those 
critics of the ATS had the opportunity to participate with 
ATCPs in research, they might better accept the current 
system. Fear and distrust are often products of limited or 
inaccurate information, and the u.s. is in the position to 
actively dispel some of the misconceptions held by those 
outside the ATS. 
overall, it is in the U.s. best interests for the 
Antarctic Treaty to remain in effect. While the u.s. 
maintains that its interests are primarily concerned with 
scientific research, when resources that the u.s. wants or 
needs become apparent, its "interests" will change. 
Freezing the status quo for another 30 years might be the 
best course to pursue, while the technology develops which 
will make Antarctic resources more accessible. 
60 
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. NAVY 
How might a review, or renegotiation, of the Antarctic 
Treaty affect the u.s. Navy? Should the Navy be concerned 
with the review? One can postulate two alternatives in the 
event of a Treaty review--the status quo continues with no 
significant changes for the Navy, or the Treaty breaks down 
and Antarctica comes open for territorial disputes. In the 
event of the latter, due to lack of proximate land bases, 
the u.s. Navy would be the most likely candidate to be used 
if military force were required. This possibility is 
reinforced by the depth of the u.s. Navy's continuing 
involvement over 40 years in support of Antarctic 
operations. 
In the first case, naval planners might want to take the 
opportunity to reevaluate the Navy's role in Antarctic 
support. Does another service or civilian organization 
potentially offer better or more practical support than the 
Navy? How could the Navy more effectively support the 
National Science Foundation? Basically, reexamine why the 
Navy is the primary u.s. support service in Antarctica, 
potential alternatives, and whether it is to the Navy's 
advantage t"' continue in this role? In the case of the 
second scenario, the Navy would definitely be involved. 
Sealift, blockade or quarantine, and sea control, 
(especially emphasizing antisubmarine warfare), are 
representative naval missions which might be required if 
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u.s. military acti~n were contemplated in Antarctica. What 
factors would affect the Navy's ability to fulfill these 
missions raises a question which will be answered in the 
tollowin~ pages. First, however, a brief history of past 
naval activities in Antarctica is necessary. 
A. PAST 
The u.s. Navy has an extensive history of Antarctic 
operations. Operation HIGHJUMP, "· .• the code name for the 
u.s. Nava~ Antarctic Developments Project of 1946-47, [was] 
the single most massive assault on Antarctica undertaken by 
any nation before 
servicemen. 118 
' II or s~nce ••.• and included 4, 700 U.S. 
ostensibly designed to map Antarctic 
terrain and practice cold weather fighting tactics, it also 
gave the military "something to do" and thus "solve[d] the 
problem of postwar demobilization." 119 This operation 
was followed in 1947-48 by Operation WINDMILL, a "task force 
of two ships", assigned to determine "the exact geographical 
location of certain mountains, capes, and other landmarks 
that could be used to 'tie in' with the aerial 
photographs" 1 2 0 taken during Operation HIGHJUMP. 
Operat:~n DEEP FREEZE, undertaken in 1955-56, was the next 
significant Antarctic operation. Assigned to support the 
upcoming Intern~tional Geophysical Year scheduled for 1957-
58, "3 icebreakers, 3 cargo vessels, an oil tanker, and 2 
11 a Shapley, The seventh Continent, p. 51. 
1 1 9Ibid. 
120paul W. Frazier, Antarctic Assault (New York: Dodd, 
Mead & Company, 1958), p. 3. 
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oil barges" sailed to Antarctica, with the goal of 
constructing two bases, one the Little America Station at 
Kainan Bay on the Ross Ice Shelf, the other, the naval air 
facility for logistics support at Hut Point, Ross Island, in 
McMurdo Sound.121 The following year saw Operation DEEP 
FREEZE II. The primary difference between DEEP FREEZE I and 
II was "the magnitude of the second operation ... 1 2 2 This 
time, "5 cargo ships, 4 icebreakers, 1 tanker, 1 transport 
for personnel, and 1 destroyer-escort which served as picket 
ship during airlift operations" voyaged to Antarctica, where 
five new bases were successfully constructed.12 3 As a 
consequence of its ability to successfully prepare 
Antarctica for the influx of scientists and support 
personnel during the Third IGY, the Navy established its 
preeminence in Antarctic support. 
B. PRESENT 
Subsequent to the IGY, was the negotiation, signing, and 
ratification of the Antarctic Treaty. A measure of the 
importance placed on nonmilitarization of Antarctica appears 
in the Treaty's first Article, which strictly forbids "any 
measures of a military nature, such as the establishment of 
military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of 
military maneuvers, as well as the testing of any type of 
1 2 1 Congress , House , .... I ..... nu.t~e,.r~n&.llaLlt,...i~o.unwal4.<l..__~.liQII:u.z..-.u~~~-4...!!i<..!4.~ Geophysical Year, p. 
127. 
1 2 2 Frazier, Antarctic Assault, p. 
1 2 3 Congress , House , ... I ..... n ..,t .... e .,.r...,.n..,a...,t .... i~o"'n,...,a ... l_"'""""......,:.o.&..l ................ ....._..........:!lo<..lA ... 149. Geophysical Year, pp. 
127-128. 
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weapons." 1 2 4 Article I does, howev~r, allow for "the use 
of military personnel or equipment for scientific research 
or for any other peaceful purpose.n12 5 This stipulation 
allows the Navy to continue in its support role, established 
almost four decades ago. The support group currently 
functions from the west coast (Port Hueneme and Point Mugu 
in California), having transferred units from the east coast 
(Davisville and Quonset Point, Rhode Island) and 
consolidated CONUS-based support operations in the early 
1970s. Forward staging of support operations has been from 
Christchurch, New Zealand. 
C. FUTURE 
Antarctica, as an area to be "used for peaceful purposes 
only", :..s, according to the Unified Command Plan, 
"unassigned" to a specific command. 1 2 6 Commander in 
Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) does provide logistical support to 
the National Science Foundation on a reimbursable basis, but 
that is the primary extent of u.s. "military" operations in 
Antarctica. If a military crisis occurred in Antarctica, 
the learning curve for military operations would be 
substantial, but not insurmountable. Evaluation of naval 
capabilities in the following areas provides some indication 
of the difficulties which could be expected in Antarctic 
operations. 
1 2 4TIAS 4780. 
:L 2 5 Ibid. 
126Mexico and Canada are also "unassigned" regions under 
the Unified Comm~nd Plan. 
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1. Antisubmarine warfare Capabilities 
In discussing problems experienced by Operation 
HIGHJUMP (1946-47), author Deborah Shapley noted that 
the submarine Sennet was sent with the fleet, but it 
proved to be a disaster in the pack ice: because it 
dared not submerge, the ice piled up on the sloping bow. 
When an icebreaker moved alongside to cut the stricken 
sub free from the ice, it nearly crushed the delicate, 
low hull. The Sennet was towed into open water, and that 
was the last time anyone seriously considered sending a 
submarine into the Antarctic pack.127 
Since that time, quite significant advances have been made 
in submarine under-ice operations.128 The Antarctic 
Treaty has also been signed since Operation HIGHJUMP, a 
factor which essentially puts waters south of 60 degrE'!es 
latitude "off limits" to military maneuvers, hence no 
submarine has operated in Antarctic waters since the 
Sennet. 129 This presents several interesting 
possibilities. First, in the event of hostilities in 
Antarctic waters, all participants would commence operations 
with similar levels of familiarity with Antarctic waters. 
Countries which have conducted more off-shore "research", 
such as Japan or the Soviet Union, may have slightly more 
information regarding the sea bed, but actual submarine 
operations should be equal--zero. 
Some operators assume that ASW in Antarctic waters would 
be similar to ASW in the Arctic Ocean, after all, they are 
127shapley, The seventh Continent, pp. 51-52. 
128Arctic operations are a significant example. 
129Alfred s. McLaren, "Save the Sturgeons to Study Global 
Change," u.s. Naval Institute Proceedings, October 1990, p. 
108. 
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both cold places, and the area of each is approximately 
5, 400,000 square miles. However, the Arctic is an ocean 
surrounded by land, whereas Antarctica is land surrounded by 
water, a fact which is sometimes lost in the analogy. In 
addressing ASW, author Tom Stefanick writes, "There are 
several essential tasks involved in destroying a submarine: 
detection, classification, localization to a small area, and 
destruction. n 1. 3 0 In the event the u.s. were conducting 
ASW against hostile submarines in Antarctic waters, 
"detection" would probably prove the most difficult step. 
In comparing ice cover between the Arctic, a known operating 
arena, with that of the Antarctic and the unknown, a 
significant fact is evident. 
In the majority of all years, the ice cover of the 
arctic waters reaches the maximum size in March, a bit 
less than twice the minimum of September. In the south-
polar regions, the variation in size is much greater. 
In September the sea ice belt around the continent is 
about six to eight times as large as the covered area in 
March. 1 3 1 
ASW operations would be conducted most advantageously during 
Antarctica's spring and summer. During the austral summer, 
the ice cover recedes with two exceptions: the Filchner Ice 
Shelf in the Weddell Sea, and the Ross Ice Shelf in the Ross 
Sea. Each of these ice shelves would provide excellent 
cover for both friendly and hostile submarines. Key u.s. 
130Tom Stefanick, Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare and 
Naval Strategy (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 
1987~ p. 4. 13 Werner Schwerdtfeger, Weather and Climate of the 
Antarctic (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers B.V., 
1984), p. 227. 
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stations (McMurdo Station and Little America) are situated 
on or near the Ross Ice Shelf, a significant fact in local 
area defense planning. 
At the opposite side of the ASW/submarine spectrum, 
instead of hunting "hostile" submarines in Antarctica, is 
the issue of their legitimate use there. A recent article 
by Dr. Alfred s. McLaren, retired Navy captain and associate 
professor at the University of Colorado (Boulder), advocates 
using the Sturgeon-class nuclear attack submarine as a polar 
research vehicle. 1. 3 2 Dr. McLaren notes the increased 
interest in "Antarctica's influence on atmospheric and 
oceanic circulation .•• [an influence] considered crucial by 
most authorities for understanding processes of global 
change. n1 6 His proposal offers two immediate benefits. It 
puts military defense equipment to a new use, still in 
"defense" but in a new way, "environmental defense"--a not 
insignificant idea in the current political environment of 
budget constraints and environmental concern.133 At the 
same time, use of these submarines would allow the u.s. to 
explore and research ~n unknown area--the waters surrounding 
Antarctica--which might prove useful in a future military 
situation. Some signatories might question Dr. McLaren's 
1. 3 2McLaren, "Save the Sturgeons," Proceedings, October 
1990, p. 108. 
1. 6Ibid. 
133congress, House, National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 1991, 101st Cong., 2d sess., H.R. 101-923, 
23 October 1990. Also, see speech given by u.s. Senator Sam 




assertion that "If the Sturgeons' torpedo tubes were 
rendered inoperational, these nuclear submarines would 
comply with the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty and 
should be acceptable as peaceful research vessels." 1 3 4 
The Norwegians for one (ATS signatory party) might recall 
the sinking of the soviet nuclear submarine, Koaso.alets, 
and challenge the u.s. operation of a nuclear submarine in 
the Antarctica. 
2. Logistics 
The Navy has provided logistic support for the 
National Science Foundation since 1957. Of all the u.s. 
military services, it has the most "corporate memory" to 
draw on if a crisis occurred in Antarctica. Weather 
conditions in Antarctica preclude all but emergency 
operations during March through September. As there are 
"only two hard runways in Antarctica capable of handling 
transport aircraft"1 3 5, air operations are somewhat 
limited. The u.s. relies on Air Force C-141 aircraft and 
ski-equipped Navy LC-130 aircraft for logistical support. 
Huey helicopters (UH-lN) provide in-area transportation for 
research personnel while on the ice. As with most 
undertakings in Antarctica, the weather (cold and wind) 
provides the greatest challenge to logistic support. Ship 
operations face some of the same problems which hamper air 
1 3 4 McLaren, "Save the Sturgeons , " Proceedings , October 
1990 p. 109. 
13!5charles Swithinbank, "Antarctic Airways: Antarctica's 
First Commercial Airline," Polar Record, October 1988, p. 
315. 
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operations. A major problem, though, facing u.s. Navy ships 
is the ice which surrounds Antarctica. Coupled with the 
fact that the u.s. has only two icebreakers remaining in its 
inventory, 1 3 6 the u.s. could be greatly disadvantaged by 
its inability to open a channel to resuppl}' personnel in 
Antarctica. The Soviets, in comparison, have over 50 
icebreakers at their disposal, a significant advantage in 
either Arctic or Antarctic operations.137 Also, as was 
noted in an Antarctic Journal article written after the 
Argentine supply ship, Bahia Paraiso, ran aground and sank 
in early 1989: 
Although today's ice-strengthened ships and icebreakers 
and improvements in technology for navigation and ice-
sensing have reduced the hazards of operating in 
antarctic waters, the need for caution has not been 
eliminated •••• [in addition to the Bahia Paraiso], the 
West German ice-strengthened research ship Gotland II 
sank off the coast of northern Victoria Land, and in 
January 1986 the private expedition ship Southern Quest 
sank near McMurdo Station. Unlike Bahia Paraiso, both 
these ships were crushed by the pack ice and sank in 
deep waters.138 
This observation would be particularly applicable in times 
of crises, pointedly keeping in mind these accidents 
"occurred during the summer, the most benign season in 
Antarctica. " 1 3 9 The Hili tary Sealift Command currently 
1 3 6 James F. Story, "Only Two Polar Icebreakers Left!", 
~~~ayal Institute Proceedings, October 1989, p. 85. 
The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the 
wo,i~ l99Qi~~~~: Their Ships. Aircraft. and Armament, ed. 
Bernard Prezelin (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute 
Press 1990), pp. 685-689 • 
.:L 3 a "Argentine Ship Sinks Near Palmer Station, II Antarctic 
~~~1 of the United States, June 1989, p. 7. 
Congress, House, Protecting Antarctica's Environment, 
pp. 106-107. 
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schedules resupply ships for Antarctic operations from 
either its fleet or by charter from private companies. 
Demand for ice-strengthened ships could easily exceed the 
supply available. 
Antarctic logistics are difficult under the best of 
circumstances. Commander, u.s. Naval Support Force, 
Antarctica, has decades of operational expertise in 
Antarctica, but in the event of hostilities, the Command 
would be hard pressed with available, specialized assets to 
support a force of significant size. 
3. Miscellaneous Factors 
Logistical support and ASW are JUSt two of the many 
factors which would challenge military operations in 
Antarctica. Numerous other factors would also come into 
play. As previously stated, surviving in the Antarctic 
environment would require as much planning and preparation 
a~ surviving a hostile attack. The number of u.s. personnel 
currently supported in Antarctica ranges between 700 to 
1, 200 in the summer months. 1 4 0 During the wintering over 
period, the population drops to between 100 and 200. As 
author Deborah Shapley noted, Operation HIGHJUMP (1946-47) 
was, and remains, the largest "assault" on Antarctica with 
4, 700 personnel.14 .1 Any ground conflict in Antarctica 
would necessarily be limited by the operational environment • 
.140population figures are derived from annual reports 
issued by Commander, u.s. Naval Support Force, Antarctica, 
1972-1985. 
1 4 1shapley, The Seventh Continent, p. '51. 
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Communication is another element of consideration in 
Antarctic operations. Sudden Ionospheric Disturbances 
(SIDs) occur which block out high frequency communications 
from hours to days. Potable water is also a factor for 
ground force operational planning. Even with stringent 
water conservation efforts, rationing is sometimes 
necessary. This appears to present a dichotomy as indicated 
by the following description of Antarctica. 
The antarctic plateau is one of the two largest deserts 
of the world, the 
Sahara ••.• [while] as 
fresh water on Earth 
~f this 'total 
Antarctica. 1 4 1 
other one being, of course, the 
much as 75% of the total supply of 
exist in the form of i~e, with 90% 
available stock' lying in 
The point is, if the supply of available water is stressed 
during normal operations, what would the situation be during 
abnormal, crisis operations? 
D. COHCLUSIOHS AHD COHCERHS 
As with any military operation, there are numerous 
hazards and factors to be considered. However, in the case 
of Antarctica, not only must the usual difficulties be 
overcome, they must be overcome in the most hostile 
environment on earth. 
In the event that military operations were required to 
support u.s. policy options in Antarctica, the following is 
an initial list of potential concerns (and unknowns) which 
would affect operational planning needs, and require further 
study. 
141schwerdtfeger, Weather and Climate, p. 3. Hult and 
Ostrander, Antarctic Icebergs, p. 5. 
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1. Military Preplanninq: Although presumably both 
USCINCPA~ and USCINCLANT would become involved, no effective 
provision currently exists in either the Unified command 
Plan or JSCP-tasked CINC Operational Plans. 
2. Co..and, Control, and co-unications (CJ): While the 
extent to which CJ affected British naval operations during 
the 1982 Falklands War has previously been documented, no 
follow-on effort known to this researcher has been attempted 
which examines potential u.s. military operations in the 
even more remote regions surrounding Antarctica. 
3. Tactical support Assets: Lacking both studied 
research and significant recent military operational 
experience, it is unclear whether the "footprint" of 
u.s. space-based tactical support systems would enable them 
to support naval operations in any manner similar to that in 
less extreme latitudes. 
4. Reaoteness Fro• Land Bases: The extreme distances 
involved in Antarctic operations and lack of proximate land 
based military support options, either operational or 
logistic, suggest that not only are naval forces the most 
likely option, but their operations would have to be planned 
quite differently from those in which periodic land-based 
support is a "normal" expectation. 
5. Tactical Eaployaent Factors: Due to all of the above 
factors, u.s. naval operations in such a "remote" area augur 
significant differences which, if not considered in 
preplanning and training exercises, could significantly 
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alter the effectiveness of such operations, in contrast to 
"reasonable expectations" in more temperate latitudes. 
6. Shock Effect: Barring any changes in "normal" 
attitudes toward the aforementioned factors, the U.S. 
military could well find itself ill-prepared to deal with 
incipient problems stemming from military aspects of any 
dispute over Antarctic resources. 
Although presumably any military power would face 
&imllar problems, significant advantage would accrue to that 
force which "gets a head start" on the plan~ing timeline, 
with consequent effects on the related Indications and 
Warning equation needed to support prudent military action. 
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The Antarctic Treaty has turned out to be much more than 
the "modt;st and limited attempt at international co-
operation serving the ••• limited needs of Antarctica", that 
Professor August Miller Jr. wrote about in 1962, as he 
critiqued Antarctica's role in world affairs.14 .2 The 
Antarctic Treaty instead has been cited again and again 
throughout the international community, as a "model of 
international cooperation. t; l 4 3 Or as Dr. Christopher 
Joyner wrote: 
The Antarctic Treaty is the preeminent international 
legal instrument embodying the twin processes of 
nonmili tarization and peaceful uses only. As su.:·h, the 
treaty stands as an exemplar for international 
cooperation and constructive diplomacy, particularly for 
promoting the reduction of military activities on a 
regional basis. 1 4 4 
The possibility of the Treaty's dissolution hopefully is 
remote, but recent international events point to the wisdom 
of preparing for the unexpected. As a British study group 
pointed out, 
The Antarctic Treaty was negotiated at a time when 
circumstances were propitious for concluding an 
agreement reflecting the delicate balance of interests 
which was required, •.• Circumstances now are very 
different, and there can be no confidence that a similar 
package, reflecting a similarly acceptable balan<:!t:- of 
14.2Auqust r. Miller, Jr., "Antarctica--White Continent of 
Promise," u.s. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1962, p. 
57. 
1 4 3 Lee, "China and Antarctica," Asian Survey, June 1990, 
~- 576. 
1 4 4 Joyner, "Nonmili tarization of the Antarctic," Naval 
War College Review, Autumn, 1989, p. 98. 
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political 1 strategic 1 scientific 1 and legal elements 1 
could be concluded today.145 
circumstances are very different today than when the 
Antarctica issue was discussed in diplomatic circles of the 
1940s and 1950s. Instead of 12 countries struggling to 
agree 1 negotiations today would at the very least involve 
the 21 countries which are consultative parties. At the 
very worst, the entire issue could be debated by all the 
Treaty signatories (currently 38 countries), as well as non-
governmental agencies andjor all members of the UN. 
Consensus, the backbone of the Treaty, would be virtually 
impossible to achieve in any event. In light of the 
possibility of these circumstances, it behooves the United 
States to discourage any review of the Antarctic Treaty. 
The conflicts which would most certainly result from a 
review would in all probability destroy the ATS. The 
Convention for the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource 
Activity is the best example to date of how difficult 
Antarctic negotiations are becoming. If the entire issue of 
Antarctica--sovereignty, territorial disputes, resource use-
-were to be renegotiated, there are too many factors which 
argue against its success. The sheer number of players, the 
extremely divergent views on resources and the environment, 
as well as, the political distrust inherent in the rising 
nationalism of the Third World. all serve to discourage hope 
for a "mutually acceptable solution." In the current 
1 4 5Anthony Parsons, Antarctica; The Next Decade 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 14. 
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international and technological environment, the United 
states' interests are best served by the present Antarctic 
Treaty. 
Perhaps the most prudent "hedge" 
outcomes is to maintain a strong 
against alternative 
u.s. Navy, whose 
demonstrable capability might even provide a modicum of 
leverage, should negotiations come to that state of affairs. 
But, as noted in the Chapter V section on conclusions and 
implications, within clear treaty-imposed limitations it 
remains true that an "ounce" of preplanning prevention is 
worth a "pound" of operational cure. This reality, coupled 
with a broader concept of "defense of the environment", 
should be prime factors which underpin the u.s. negotiating 
stance to retain the current ATS status quo. 
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APPENDIX A 
THE ANTARCTIC TREATY 
The Governments of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, 
the French Republic, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Union 
of South Africa, the Union of Soviet Social 1st Republics, 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
and the United states of America, 
Recognizing that it is in the interest of all mankind 
that Antarctica shall continue forever to be used 
exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become the 
scene or object of international discord; 
Acknowledging the substantial contributions to 
scientific knowledge resulting from international 
cooperation in scientific investigation in Antarctica; 
Convinced that the establishment of a firm foundation 
for the continuation and development of such cooperation on 
the basis of freedom of scientific investigation in 
Antarctica as applied during the International Geophysical 
Year accords with the interests of science and the progress 
of all mankind; 
Convinced also that a treaty ensuring the use of 
Antarctica for peaceful purposes only and the continuance of 
international harmony in Antarctica will further the 
purposes and principles embodied in the Charter of the 
United Nations; 




1. Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. 
There shall be prohibited, inter alia, any measures of a 
military nature, such as the establishment of military bases 
and fortifications, the carrying out of military maneuvers, 
as well as the testing of any type of weapons. 
2. The present Treaty shall not prevent the use of military 
personnel or equipment for scientific research or for any 
other peaceful purpose. 
Article II 
Freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica and 
cooperation toward that end, as applied during the 
International Geophysical Year, shall continue, subject to 
the provisions of the present Treaty. 
Article III 
1. In order to promote international cooperation in 
scientific investigation in Antarctica, as provided for in 
Article II of the present Treaty, the Contracting Parties 
agree that, to the greatest extent feasible and practicable: 
(a) information regarding plans for scientific 
programs in Antarctica shall be exchanged to permit 
maximum economy and efficiency of operations; 
(b) scientific personnel shall be exchanged in 
Antarctica between expeditions and stations; 
( c} scientific observations and results from 




1. Nothing contained in the present Treaty shall be 
interpreted as: 
(a) a renunciation by any Contracting Party of 
previously asserted rights of or claims to territorial 
sovereignty in Antarctica: 
(b) a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting 
Party of any basis of claim to territorial sovereignty 
in Antarctica which it may have whether as a result of 
its activities or those of its nationals in Antarctica, 
or otherwise: 
(c) prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party 
as regards its recognition or non-recognition of any 
other State's right of or claim or basis of claim to 
territorial sovereignty in Antarctica. 
2. No acts or activities taking place while the present 
Treaty is in force shall constitute a basis for asserting, 
supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in 
Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in 
Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an existing 
claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be 
asserted while the present Treaty is in force. 
Article v 
1. Any nuclear explosions in Antarctica and the disposal 
there of radioactive waste material shall be prohibited. 
2. In the event of the conclusion of international 
agreements concerning the use of nuclear energy, including 
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nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste 
material, to which all of the Contracting Parties whose 
representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings 
provided for under Article IX are parties, the rules 
established under such agreements shall apply in Antarctica. 
Article VI 
The provisions of the present Treaty shall apply to the 
area south of 60 degrees South Latitude, including all ice 
shelves, but nothing in the present Treaty shall prejudice 
or in any way affect the rights, or the exercise of the 
rights, of any State under international law with regard to 
the high seas within that a~ea. 
Article VII 
1 • In order to promote the objectives and ensure the 
observance of the provisions of the present Treaty, each 
Contracting Party whose representatives are entitled to 
participate in the meetings referred to in Article IX of the 
Treaty shall have the right to designate observers to carry 
out any inspection provided for by the present Article. 
Observers shall be nationals of the Contracting Parties 
which designate them. The names of observers shall be 
communicated to every other Contracting Party having the 
right to designate observers, and like notice shall be given 
of the termination of there appointment. 
2. Each observer designated in accordance 






complete freedom of access at any time to any or all areas 
of Antarctica. 
3. All areas of Antarctica, including all stations, 
installations and equipment within those areas, and all 
ships and aircraft at points of discharging or embarking 
cargoes or personnel in Antarctica, shall be open at all 
times to inspection by any observers designated in 
accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article. 
4. Aerial observation may be carried out at any time over 
any or all areas of Antarctica by any of the Contracting 
Parties having the right to designate observers. 
5. Each Contracting Party shall, at the time when the 
present Treaty enters into force for it, inform the other 
Contracting Parties, and thereafter shall give them notice 
in advance, of 
(a) all expeditions to and within Antarctica, on the 
part of its si,i.ps or nationals, and all expeditions to 
Antarctica organized in or proceeding from its 
territory; 
(b) all stations in Antarctica occupied by its 
nationals; and 
(c) any military personnel or equipment intended to be 
introduced by it into Antarctica subject to the 
conditions prescribed in paragraph 2 of Article I of 
the present Treaty. 
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Article VIII 
1. In order to facilitate the exercise of their 
functions under the present Treaty, and without 
prejudice to the respective positions of the 
Contracting Parties relating to jurisdiction over all 
other persons in Antarctica, observers designated under 
paragraph 1 of Article VII and scientific personnel 
exchanged under subparagraph l(b) of Article III of the 
Treaty, and members of the staffs accompanying any such 
persons, shall be subject only to the jurisdiction of 
the Contracting Party of which they are nationals in 
respect of all acts or omissions occurring while they 
are in Antarctica for the purposes of exercising their 
functions. 
2. Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 1 
of this Article, and pending the adoption of measures 
in pursuance of subparagraph 1 (e) of Article IX, the 
Contracting Parties concerned in any case of dispute 
with regard to the exercise of jurisdiction in 
Antarctica shall immediately consult together with a 
view to reaching a mutually acceptable solution. 
Article IX 
1. Repre~3ntatives of the Contracting Parties named in 
the preamble to the present Treaty shall meet at the 
City of canberra within two months after the date of 
entry into force of the Treaty, and thereafter at 
suitable intervals and places, for the purpose of 
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exchanging information, consulting togethe~ on matters 
of common interest pertaining to Antarctica, and 
formulating and considering, and recommending to their 
Governments, measures in furtherance of the principle~ 




use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only; 
facilitation of scientific research in 
Antarctica; 
(c) facilitation of international scientific 
cooperation in Antarctica; 
(d) facilitation of the exercise of the rights of 
inspection provided for in Article VII of the 
Treaty; 
(e) questions relating to the exercise of 
jurisdiction in Ar.tarctica; 
(f) preservation and conservation of living 
resources in Antarctica. 
2. Each Contracting Party which has become a party to 
the present Treaty by accession under Article XIII 
shall be entitled to appoint representatives to 
participate in the meetings referred to in paragraph 1 
~f the present Article, during such time as that 
Contracting Party demonstrates its interest in 
Antarctica by conducting substantial scientific 
research activity there, such as the establishment of a 
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scientific station or the despatch of a scientific 
expedition. 
3. Reports from the observers referred to in Article 
VII of the present Treaty shall be transmitted to the 
representatives of the Contracting Parties 
participating in ~~s meetings referred to in paragraph 
1 of the present Article. 
4. The measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this 
Article shall become effective when approved by all the 
Contracting Parties whose representatives were entitled 
to participate in the meetings held to consider those 
measures. 
5. Any or all of the rights established in the present 
Treaty may be exercised as from the date of entry into 
force of the Treaty whether or not any measures 
facilitating the exercise of such rights have been 
proposed, considered or approved as provided in this 
Article. 
Article X 
Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes to exert 
appropriate efforts, consistent with the Charter of the 
United Nations, to the end that no one engages in any 
activity in Antarctica contrary to the principles or 
purposes of the present Treaty. 
Article XI 
1. If any dispute arises between two or more of the 
Contracting Parties concerning the interpretation or 
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application of the present Treaty, those Contracting 
Parties shall consult among themselves with a view to 
having the dispute resolved by negotiation, inquiry, 
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial 
settlement or other peaceful means of their own choice. 
2. Any dispute of this character not so resolved 
shall, with the consent, in each case, of all parties 
to the dispute, be referred to the International Court 
of Justice for settlement; but failure to reach 
agreement on reference to the International court shall 
not absolve parties to the dispute from the 
responsibility of continuing to seek to resolve it by 
any to the vari~us peaceful means referred to in 
paragraph 1 of this Article. 
Article XII 
1. (a) The present Treaty may be modified or amended 
at any time by unanimous agreement of the Contracting 
Parties whose representatives are entitled to 
participate in the meetings provided for under Article 
IX. Any such modification or amendment shall enter 
into force when the ~epositary Government has received 
notice from all such Contracting Parties that they have 
ratified it. 
(b) Such modification or amendment shall 
thereafter enter into force as to any other Contracting 
Party when notice ot ratification by it has been 
received by the depositary Government. 
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Any such 
Contracting Party from which no notice of ratification 
is received within a period of two years from the date 
of entry into force of the modification or amendment in 
accordance with the provisions of subparagraph l(a) of 
this Article shall be deemed to have withdrawn from the 
present Treaty on the date of the expiration of such 
period. 
2. (a) If after the expiration of thirty years from 
the date of entry into force of the present Treaty, any 
of the Contracting Parties whose representative are 
entitled to participate in the meetings provided for 
under Article IX so requests by a communication 
addressed to the depositary Government, a Conference of 
all the Contracting Parties shall be held as soon as 
practicable to review the operation of the Treaty. 
(b) Any modification or amendment to the present 
Treaty which is approved at such a Conference by a 
majority of those Contracting Parties there 
represented, including a majority of those whose 
representatives are entitled to participate in the 
meetings provided for under A~ticle IX, shall be 
communicated by the depositary Government to all the 
Contracting Parties immediately after the termination 
of the Conference and shall enter into force in 
accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of the 
present Article. 
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(c) If any such modification or amendment has not 
entered into force in accordance with the provisions of 
subparagraph 1 (a) of this Article within a period of 
two years after the date of its communication to all 
the Contracting Parties, any Contracting Party may at 
any time after the expiration of that period five 
notice to the depositary Government of its withdrawal 
from the present Treaty; and such withdrawal shall take 
effect two years after the receipt of the notice by the 
depositary Government. 
Article XIII 
1. The present Treaty shall be subject to ratification 
by the signatory States. It shall be open for 
accession by any State which is a Member of the United 
Nations, or by any other State which may be invited to 
accede to the Treaty with the consent of all the 
Contracting Parties whose representatives ar~ entitled 
to participate in the meetings provided for under 
Article IX of the Treaty. 
2. Ratification of or accession to the present Treaty 
shall be effected by each State in accordance with its 
constitutional processes. 
3. Instruments of ratification and instruments of 
accession shall be deposited with the Government of the 
United States of America, hereby designated as the 
depositary Government. 
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4. The depositary Government shall inform all 
signatory and acceding States of the date of each 
deposit of an instrument of ratification or accession, 
and the date of entry into force of the Treaty and of 
any modification or amendment thereto. 
5. Upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by 
all the signatory States, the present Treaty shall 
enter into force for those States and for States which 
have deposited instruments of accession. Thereafter 
the Treaty shall enter into force for any acceding 
State upon the deposit of its instrument of accession. 
6. The present Treaty shall be registered by the 
depositary Government pursuant to Article 102 of the 
Charter of the United Nations. 
Article XIV 
The present Treaty, done in the English, French, 
Russian and Spanish languages, each version being 
equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives 
of the Government of the United States of America, 
which shall transmit duly certified copies thereof to 
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Source: Anthony Parsons, Antarctica: The Next Decade 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
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